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Thick Marks, Thin Marks 
Michael Grynberg† 
Abstract 
Not all trademarks are created equal. Strong marks like APPLE 
computer receive more protection than lesser known, weaker marks like 
JOE’S diner. The difference is reflected by the amount of attention 
judges pay to surrounding context in resolving infringement claims. 
When a mark receives “thick” protection, facts that might make 
confusion less likely (e.g., clarifying marketplace realities or perceptible 
differences between the parties’ marks) matter less than when 
protection is “thin.” 
This conception of thick or thin protection is part of routine 
trademark disputes, but it has more interesting implications for 
trademark law. Trademarks do more than identify a product’s source. 
They embody connotative and abstract meanings over which trademark 
owners seek control. Traditional trademark doctrine is often ill-suited 
to resolve the resulting litigation. One way courts respond is by cali-
brating thickness of protection. Judges receptive to the expansion of 
trademark rights may grant thick protection; skeptical judges, thin. 
This shortcut frustrates the development of precedent. Treating a mark 
as thin, for example, enables courts to resist broad trademark claims 
without disturbing their doctrinal underpinnings. This softens the 
impact of trademark’s growing scope in individual cases, but without 
providing comfort to future defendants. 
Unfortunately, judicial fluctuation between thick and thin protec-
tion is inevitable and intertwined with the long, unresolved debate 
about the extent to which trademarks should be treated as a form of 
property. Drawing on the literature describing modularity and property 
rights, this Article argues that thick trademark protection is sim-
ultaneously appealing to judges yet impossible over the long run. Thick 
protection offers the ability to hide complex interactions between 
trademark meanings behind a simpler property signal, leaving it to the 
trademark owner to manage them. This approach may be understood 
as an information-economizing tool that frees a judge from the task of 
determining whether an unauthorized use of a mark’s extended meaning 
adversely affects its core, source-identifying function. But many such 
uses implicate the interests of third parties who cannot rely on the 
economic decisions of the mark owner for vindication. Because 
trademark doctrine also recognizes the importance of these concerns,  
†  Associate Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. Comments 
welcome at mgrynber@depaul.edu. My thanks to Barton Beebe, Emily 
Cauble, Andrew Gold, Laura Heymann, Jake Linford, Mark Moller, and 
Mark Weber for comments on earlier drafts or other airings of the ideas 
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consistent treatment of trademarks as thick is impossible 
notwithstanding the lure of the property shortcut. Judicial uncertainty 
and unclear doctrine is the result. 
Courts should think more clearly and explicitly about when thick 
protection is appropriate. Many extended trademark meanings are built 
out of a mark’s source-identification function. This suggests that the 
case for thick protection is strongest when a mark’s source identification 
capability is threatened, but weaker with respect to other meanings. 
Some doctrinal developments in trademark law reflect this view; others 
do not. But regardless of whether one agrees with this approach to 
trademark thickness, judicial choices on the subject should be 
acknowledged and made transparent. 
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Introduction 
Trademarks embody a range of information. Some of it is simple—
what is the physical source of this product? Some is more complex—
how do I feel about COCA-COLA? Many open questions in modern 
trademark law concern which parts of the range belong under the 
trademark holder’s control. One way courts answer the question is to 
decide how much of a mark must be used to trigger liability. 
Courts can do this because trademarks receive protection beyond 
equivalents (counterfeits). The scope of the equivalence needed for lia-
bility varies from context to context. In a traditional infringement case, 
for example, the proximity of parties’ products matters. A cheese grater 
branded CRAFT is more likely to infringe the KRAFT foods mark than 
a CRAFT computer.1 
As Part I explains, we might refer to the difference between these 
two examples as being one in the “thickness” of protection given the 
mark.2 The KRAFT mark has more infringing analogs in food-related 
markets than elsewhere. This result is unsurprising and easily explain-
ed. Trademark law is concerned with the question of whether a con-
sumer will perceive the defendant’s product as coming from the plain-
tiff. Its doctrine makes the empirical assumption that confusion be-
tween marks is more likely in proximate markets than remote ones. 
Likewise, it assumes that “strong” marks—marks that courts treat as 
inherently distinctive and/or marks that have attained a high level of 
recognition among the relevant consuming public—are more likely to 
be infringed than weak ones. Thickness of protection, therefore, may be 
a function both of a mark’s characteristics or reflected by surrounding 
context.3 
In addition to being part of traditional confusion analysis, judicial 
calibration of trademark thickness can be a tool for managing 
conflicting interests. Suppose the owner of a wine store claims that its 
layout deserves trademark protection. Litigation against a store that 
uses a similar design might raise proximity issues similar to the KRAFT 
example (e.g., is the defendant a wine seller or a grocery store that sells 
wine?). The parties could also be expected to litigate whether the layout 
 
1. See infra Part I.A.1. 
2. The concept of thick and thin protection is familiar in copyright law. See 
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) 
(“[T]he copyright in a factual compilation is thin. Notwithstanding a valid 
copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free to use the facts contained in 
another’s publication to aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the 
competing work does not feature the same selection and arrangement.”). 
Though this Article uses the same terminology, some applications differ. See 
infra note 90. 
3. See infra Part I.A.1. 
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is distinctive and capable of functioning as a trademark. Even if it were, 
the defendant might argue that the plaintiff is claiming functional 
matter that should be free for other competitors to use.4 
Resolving these issues might counsel withholding trademark pro-
tection, but the Lanham Act is generous with respect to eligible trade-
mark subject matter.5 Alternatively, a court might extend protection to 
the mark, while treating it as thin. Maybe the total package of the 
store’s design features conveys a source-identifying message, but only 
as a whole. Copying some, but not all of, the components will therefore 
not cause consumer confusion. A court might likewise resolve the func-
tionality issue by allowing copying up to, but just short of, the whole.6 
Calibrating trademark thickness has more interesting uses. It is a 
vehicle by which courts resolve nontraditional and controversial trade-
mark claims pertaining to matters other than source confusion. Trade-
marks also embody connotative and abstract meanings, and trademark 
owners naturally seek to control as much of the range as possible. The 
problem is that the doctrines developed to adjudicate disputes 
concerning source-identifying meaning are often ill-suited to disposing 
of litigation concerning expanded meanings.7 The test developed to 
determine whether consumers are likely to be confused about a 
trademark’s source, for example, is not calibrated for the issue of 
whether consumers mistakenly perceive an affiliation between two 
products. The latter claim creates less possibility of consumer harm 
than the former, but is often easier to establish.8 Likewise, the case for 
 
4. See infra Part I.C.1. 
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012) (providing that unless a mark falls into a listed 
exclusion, “[n]o trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be 
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the 
principal register on account of its nature”); § 1127 (“The term ‘trademark’ 
includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof . . . [used] to identify and distinguish . . . goods.”); see Two Pesos, 
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (treating restaurant decor as 
inherently distinctive and eligible for trade dress protection). 
6. See Best Cellars, Inc. v. Wine Made Simple, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 60, 72 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[W]hile the emphasis on specific combinations and total 
visual impact makes it relatively easy for a plaintiff to meet the inherent 
distinctiveness aspect of the trade dress infringement test, the same emphasis 
makes it correspondingly difficult for a plaintiff to prove likelihood of 
confusion. That is because defendant-competitors who have some similar 
elements as well as noteworthy dissimilar elements in their trade dress may 
be able to show that the specific combination of elements that they use also 
constitutes protectable trade dress, and that consumers are unlikely to 
confuse the two products, or in this case, the two stores.”) (citation omitted). 
See also infra Part I.C.1. 
7. See infra Part I.C.2. 
8. Id. 
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protecting expanded meaning may have a tenuous connection with 
traditional trademark rationales. 
Judges receptive to expanding trademark rights may resolve the 
tension by simply granting thick protection that elides the distinction 
between the categories of meanings potentially embodied by a mark. 
And judges skeptical of expansive trademark claims may accord re-
ciprocally thin protection. While disposing of the case at hand, the 
move frustrates the development of precedent. Treating a mark as thin 
enables a court to resist a broad trademark claim without disturbing its 
doctrinal underpinnings. This method softens the impact of trademark’s 
growing scope, but in a way that limits the benefit to future 
defendants.9 
Part II suggests that judicial vacillation between thick and thin 
protection may be inevitable, for thick trademark protection is simul-
taneously appealing to judges yet impossible over the long run. Thick 
protection hides complex interactions of various trademark meanings 
behind a simpler property signal, leaving it to the trademark owner to 
manage them by licensing the mark where appropriate.10 This approach 
may be understood as an information-economizing tool that frees judges 
from sorting out whether unauthorized uses of a mark actually threaten 
core trademark functions of source identification and consumer 
protection. But the shortcut carries costs. The scope that a mark needs 
in the realm of source identification is not necessarily appropriate for 
claims concerning, say, a false perception of affiliation. Thick protection 
buys clarity at the expense of ignoring this nuance.11 Furthermore, 
many unauthorized trademark uses implicate the interests of third 
parties who cannot rely on the economic decisions of the mark owner 
for vindication.12 Trademark doctrine recognizes these interests, making 
consistent treatment of trademarks as thick effectively impossible. But 
the appeal of the property shortcut is not easily ignored. Judicial 
uncertainty between thick and thin protection is the result and 
manifests itself in unclear doctrine. 
Part III argues that courts should think more clearly and explicitly 
about when thick protection is appropriate and about what kinds of 
trademark meaning are at stake in litigation. Many extended trademark 
meanings are built out of the mark’s source-identification function. This 
suggests that the case for thick protection is strongest when a mark’s 
source-identification function is at risk but less so with respect to 
peripheral meanings. If they are lost, other meanings remain intact. In 
contrast, if a mark loses its source-identifying function, a host of 
meanings fall with it. 
 
9. Id. 
10. See infra Part II.B. 
11. See infra Part II.A. 
12.  See infra II.B. 
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If, nonetheless, trademark law must expand its reach to new do-
mains, there is some benefit to granting strong but narrow protection 
in a way that isolates the expansion from the general operation of 
trademark law. Some doctrinal developments in trademark law reflect 
these views; others do not. Given the importance of the underlying 
issues, it would be preferable if the choices on this score were acknow-
ledged and made transparent. 
I. The Problem of Trademark Thickness 
This Part describes the concept of thickness and thinness of trade-
mark protection and its relationship to the more commonly drawn dis-
tinction between strong and weak trademarks. It then explains how the 
metaphor applies to contested doctrinal issues of trademark scope and 
how courts calibrate thickness of protection to resolve them. 
A. What is a Thick Mark? 
1. Thick and Thin Marks 
This Article uses the term thickness (and by extension thinness) of 
protection to encompass two potential meanings. First, we might say 
that a mark receives thick protection when another’s mark is found 
infringing notwithstanding distinguishing factors. A thick mark has a 
broader range of actionable counterparts than a comparatively—and 
these are relative terms—thin one. So we might say that a ruling that 
KOKE-UP infringes COCA-COLA demonstrates some thickness of 
protection for the latter.13 In contrast, a ruling that a broom with a 
contrasting bristle color scheme is not infringed by a similar broom 
using different colors may be explained as a case in which the plaintiff’s 
mark received thin protection.14 Let us call this a mark’s internal 
thickness. It reflects the level of protection given to individual mark 
features in comparison to the allegedly infringing mark. A mark is thick 
to the extent that individual aspects of a mark, and their similarities 
to the defendant’s mark, are capable of providing the basis of an 
infringement ruling notwithstanding the existence of distinguishing 
features or unshared elements. 
Trademark infringement cases consider more than mark similarity. 
Context also matters. The second sense in which we might describe a 
 
13. Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405, 410 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (“One who 
enters a field already occupied by another as in the instant case, should be 
careful in the selection of a tradename or trademark, keeping far enough 
away from the plaintiff’s tradename or trademark to avoid any possible 
confusion.”). 
14. Libman Co. v. Vining Indus., Inc., 69 F.3d 1360, 1363 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(observing that plaintiff’s “trademark is a thin one, since adding a colored 
stripe is hardly a distinctive way of marking a product”). 
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mark as having thick protection concerns the amount of favorable 
contextual evidence necessary to translate whatever similarity there is 
into liability. The less the surrounding circumstances matter—i.e., the 
extent to which mark similarity overwhelms context favorable to the 
defendant—the thicker the mark. Let us call this the external thickness 
of a mark. Calibration of external thickness is a standard part of 
trademark litigation. Every judicial circuit has adopted some version of 
a multifactor likelihood of confusion test.15 Many of the factors that 
courts consider measure context that is independent of the trademarks 
at issue, such as market proximity or consumer sophistication.16 
The multifactor likelihood of confusion tests consider both 
trademark-specific and contextual factors.17 A court’s assessment of a 
mark’s strength and similarity to the allegedly infringing symbol may 
reflect the plaintiff mark’s internal thickness; the court’s treatment of 
factors like market proximity or consumer sophistication may reflect 
external thickness. A court may treat a mark as thick on both axes, 
raising the chicken-egg dilemma of whether internal or external context 
drives the decision.18 Likewise, the final balancing of the factors often 
defies structured analysis and allows internal and external factors to 
merge into a decision in indeterminate ways.19 As a conceptual matter 
it is worth noting that a mark may be treated as internally but not 
externally thick, or vice versa. Depending on the context, therefore, we 
 
15. See 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition §§ 24:30–:43 (4th ed. 2013) (examining factors used by 
circuits). The classic rendering of the test came in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad 
Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (considering (1) strength 
of plaintiff’s mark, (2) degree of similarity between marks, (3) competitive 
proximity of litigants’ products, (4) any actual confusion, (5) likelihood that 
plaintiff will “bridge the gap” separating the two markets, (6) whether 
defendant acted in good faith in adopting its mark, (7) quality of defendant’s 
product, and (8) purchaser sophistication). 
16.  4 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 23:95 (discussing consumer sophistication); 
§ 24:18 (discussing proximity).  
17. See, e.g., id. § 24:31 (listing factors used by the First Circuit). 
18. In his study of use of multifactor cases from circuit to circuit, Barton Beebe 
reports that courts will often “stampede” factors once certain critical factors 
point in one direction or another. That is, once the decision is made, the 
remaining factors are read to fall in line. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study 
of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1581, 
1581–82 (2006) (“A few factors prove to be decisive; the rest are at best 
redundant and at worst irrelevant. Judges tend to ‘stampede’ these remaining 
factors to conform to the test outcome, particularly when they find 
infringement.”).  
19. For example, the final balancing of AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, in its 
entirety, was as follows: “Based on the preceding analysis, we hold that 
Nescher has infringed the Slickcraft mark.” 599 F.2d 341, 354 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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might say a mark has thick protection even though it is not thick in 
every possible meaning of the word. 
2. Thick Marks, Thin Marks, Strong Marks, Weak Marks 
The description of thick and thin marks above overlaps with the 
more traditional and familiar conception of strong and weak marks. The 
strength of a plaintiff’s mark is a standard factor in the multifactor 
test.20 Strength refers to a mark’s ability to signal source21 and 
distinguish itself from competitors.22 As traditionally applied by the 
courts, trademark strength has two flavors.23 The first class of strong 
marks comprise those that trademark law views as naturally signaling 
source. Courts place marks on a spectrum of distinctiveness from strong 
to weak. Fanciful (e.g., KODAK film) and arbitrary (e.g., APPLE 
computers) marks are on the strong end.24 They are treated as 
inherently distinctive.25 Descriptive marks (e.g., TASTY hamburgers) 
lie at the other end of the spectrum and receive protection only upon a 
showing that consumers identify them as performing a source-
identifying function (i.e., that they have secondary meaning).26  
20. See, e.g., 4 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 23:19 (listing factors courts 
consider when assessing trademark infringement cases). 
21. See, e.g., Versa Prod. Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.) Ltd., 50 F.3d 189, 203 
(3d Cir. 1995) (“A strong trademark is thus one that carries widespread, 
immediate recognition that one producer (even if unknown) is associated 
with the mark, and so with the product.”). 
22. Barton Beebe writes that conceptualizing strength as the ability to signal 
source is not the issue so much as a mark’s ability to distinguish itself from 
other marks. Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 
Mich. L. Rev. 2020, 2028 (2005). It is this capability, “differential 
distinctiveness,” that “prescribes the scope of trademark protection when 
protection is given. This is the form of distinctiveness that trademark lawyers 
have in mind when they speak of trademark ‘strength.’” Id. In his view, 
equating the ability to distinguish source with a mark’s differential 
distinctiveness, as trademark law does, is unwarranted. Id. at 2030 
(“Trademark law has traditionally held, perhaps incorrectly, that marks 
which are inherently source distinctive possess an inbuilt degree of differential 
distinctiveness . . . .”). 
23. See, e.g., Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 
270, 282 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The strength of a mark is determined by (1) the 
distinctiveness or conceptual strength of the mark and (2) its commercial 
strength or marketplace recognition.”). 
24. See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 
(2d Cir. 1976) (“[F]anciful or arbitrary terms enjoy all the rights accorded 
to suggestive terms as marks without the need of debating whether the term 
is ‘merely descriptive’ and with ease of establishing infringement.”). 
25. Suggestive marks, those that indirectly suggest a quality of a product, are 
also treated as inherently distinctive, but of varying conceptual strength. Id. 
26. Id. at 10. 
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Category-identifying terms (e.g., APPLE apples) are generic and in-
eligible for trademark protection.27  
The second class of strong marks comprises those that have 
achieved a high level of recognition with the consuming public; they 
have strong acquired distinctiveness. Acquired distinctiveness is used 
to divide descriptive marks that have achieved secondary meaning (and 
thus status as a mark) from those that have not, but the concept applies 
equally to assessing the overall strength of a mark.28 This allows 
conceptually weak descriptive marks to be nonetheless commercially 
strong.29 
The treatment of strong marks is similar to the treatment of thick 
marks described above.30 When a plaintiff’s mark is strong, courts 
adjust their treatment of other factors in the plaintiff’s favor.31 Courts 
will be less likely to overlook distinguishing matter and more likely to 
find that consumers are likely to be confused by the defendant’s similar 
mark in a non-directly competing market.32 Moreover, in determining 
similarity between marks, courts are more apt to find similarity where 
the shared element may be characterized as one that gives the plaintiff’s 
mark its strength (e.g., that the overlap is an arbitrary word rather 
 
27. Id. at 9. 
28. See, e.g., Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Sys., Inc., 726 F.3d 1136, 1154 (10th Cir. 
2013) (“The difference between commercial strength and secondary meaning 
is that the former is a range, while the latter is a threshold: a mark may enjoy 
anything from a high degree of commercial strength to a low degree, but 
either it has secondary meaning or it does not.”). Mark strength and 
secondary meaning are generally proven with similar evidence. Id. 
29. Id. at 1153. 
30. See, e.g., 2 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 11:73 (“‘Strong’ marks are given 
‘strong’ protection—protection over a wide range of related products and 
services and variations on visual and aural format . . . . Conversely, relatively 
weak marks are given a relatively narrow range of protection both as to 
products and format variations. To be more precise, there are three 
dimensions along which the relative strength of a mark may operate: market, 
format and territory.”) (citations omitted). 
31. See, e.g., Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1155 (“Given the weakness of the [senior 
user’s] mark, the likelihood of confusion is small unless the challenged mark 
is very similar.”). 
32. See, e.g., Versa Prod. Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.) Ltd., 50 F.3d 189, 203 
(3d Cir. 1995) (“If a second comer adopts a mark substantially identical to a 
strong mark, there is a correspondingly high likelihood that consumers will 
mistakenly associate the newcomer’s product with the owner of the strong 
mark. The same may be said of a ‘strong’ trade dress consisting of a product’s 
packaging.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 1·2016 
Thick Marks, Thin Marks 
22 
than a descriptive one).33 Simply put, strong marks are generally thick 
ones.34 
Strong marks are still conceptually something different than thick 
ones as that term is used here. First, traditional conceptions of strong 
and weak marks are used to address narrow issues in trademark dis-
putes. Strength as a source identifier matters for determining whether 
certain classes of marks receive protection35 and as one factor of many 
in the multifactor likelihood of confusion test.36 By contrast, I use the 
term thickness to describe not an attribute of the mark but how courts 
treat it—how much protection the mark receives in light of other 
context within a case. That answer might depend on other factors 
independent of strength, like the sophistication of consumers in the 
market or the proximity of markets.37 
Moreover, a mark’s strength may diverge from the amount of 
protection it receives given the nature of the claim. COCA-COLA 
receives thick protection in a passing off case in which another product 
bears the COCA-COLA mark. If I market a competing COCA-COLA 
soda, a court is unlikely to spend much time looking at marketplace 
conditions before deeming me an infringer.38 If, however, I market my 
soda as being better than COCA-COLA, context will be all.39 A mark  
33. See, e.g., 4 McCarthy, supra note 15, §§ 23:48, 11:76, 11:85 (collecting 
examples). 
34. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 21 cmt. i (Am. Law 
Inst. 1995) (“‘Strong’ marks that have a high degree of distinctiveness are 
thus protected against the use of similar marks on a wider range of goods or 
services than are ‘weak’ designations that have less distinctiveness or market 
recognition.”). 
35. A mark’s acquired distinctiveness is now a threshold question as well for the 
question of whether it will receive federal dilution protection. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c) (2012) (providing for dilution protection for famous marks). 
36.  See 4 McCarthy, supra note 15 (listing factors used by courts to assess 
trademark infringement). 
37. To be sure, courts may accomplish this by characterizing the mark as strong 
or weak. 
38. It used to be the case that trademark cases involving marks in the same 
market would simply consider similarity and dispense with multifactor 
analysis. See infra notes 227–228 and accompanying text. This kind of 
thinking lives on in the counterfeiting context. A counterfeit mark is “a 
spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable 
from, a registered mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). Using one may bring 
enhanced damages. Id. § 1117. Where such identity is present, courts often 
dispense with further analysis. 4 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 25:10 
(“Courts assume that if the goods are so similar as to be regarded as 
‘counterfeit,’ then a likelihood of confusion must be present.”). 
39. The Ninth Circuit will ask, for example, whether the defendant did anything 
“that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or 
endorsement by the trademark holder.” New Kids on the Block v. News Am. 
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may be very strong, but courts may only give it thin protection given 
the nature of the claim or other context.40 
Given the working of the multifactor test, however, it is true that 
the distinction between strong and thick marks sheds little additional 
light in ordinary source-confusion cases involving word-based marks. 
The distinction between the two matters more when considering cases 
involving a trademark’s extended meaning, as explained below. 
B. The Problem of Trademark Scope 
1. Trademark Information 
Trademarks identify and distinguish goods and services in the 
marketplace.41 The phrase “identify and distinguish” hearkens back to 
the conception of a trademark as a simple source identifier.42 Today, of 
course, trademarks do a good deal more.43 They represent sponsorship, 
franchising, and other affiliation relationships, and the Lanham Act 
 
Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). Looking 
beyond the mark is part of the court’s nominative fair use test. Id. at 307–
08. 
40. See, e.g., infra notes 106-121 and accompanying text (describing a case in 
which the Louboutin shoe design, though well-known, received thin 
protection). 
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). The modern Lanham Act essentially collapsed the 
distinction between trademark law, which protected only a certain class of 
marks, and unfair competition law, which protected certain devices that 
trademark law did not, like color and trade dress, upon a showing of 
secondary meaning. See generally 1 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 4:5 
(“Under archaic usage, marks that were not inherently distinctive were not 
protected as ‘technical trademarks,’ but were protected as ‘trade names’ 
under the law of ‘unfair competition’ upon proof of secondary meaning.”); 
id. § 4:12 (“The Lanham Act of 1946 integrated the two types of common 
law marks (technical trademarks and trade names), calling both types 
‘trademarks’ and treating them in essentially the same manner.”); id. § 8:1 
(observing that trade dress protection was part of unfair competition law, 
which required secondary for its protection). 
42. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 9 cmt. d (Am. 
Law Inst. 1995) (“The earliest cases involving trademarks were actions on 
the case in the nature of deceit. The issue in each case was whether the 
defendant had imitated the plaintiff’s mark for the purpose of misrepresenting 
the defendant’s goods as those of the plaintiff. These actions eventually 
evolved into a distinct tort of ‘passing off,’ or ‘unfair competition’ as it came 
to be known in the United States.”). 
43. And even the concept of “source” covers more ground than it once did. See 
Laura Heymann, Naming, Identity, and Trademark Law, 86 Ind. L.J. 381, 
388 (2011) (noting a “move to representing collections of qualities rather 
than individual manufacturers”). Moreover, the source identification function 
may be dominated by the distinguishing function. See supra note 22 and 
accompanying text. 
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protects this information as well.44 Most broadly, trademarks function 
as a receptacle of corporate identity and serve as a point of relationship 
with the public at large.45 
This raises familiar questions about the appropriate scope of 
trademark rights. Consider the power to enjoin uses that cause likely 
confusion as to the markholder’s “approval” of a use.46 Is it limited to 
sponsorship situations or does it reach cases where consumers think the 
markholder merely permits the activity without endorsement?47 Must 
trademark rights be cleared before a movie depicts a mark?48 Should 
trademark owners have a monopoly on merchandise markets that 
feature their logos, and if so, how far should such a right go?49 How 
broadly should the owners of famous marks be able to invoke dilution 
doctrine?50  
These questions and others like them are hard for a variety of 
reasons. There is a mismatch between current interpretations of the 
Lanham Act, whose text is open to broad readings, and traditional 
doctrine. While often criticized for “propertizing” trademarks or 
otherwise tilting the law in favor of trademark owners at consumer  
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) (providing for liability for engaging in an activity 
that “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to 
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another 
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, 
services, or commercial activities by another person”). 
45. Some argue that the segue from source to brand frustrates a trademark’s 
consumer information function. See, e.g., Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 
Conn. L. Rev. 83, 84 (2010) (“Research demonstrates that emotional 
branding results in mistaken quality judgments and hinders rational 
purchasing decisions by consumers, thereby distorting market 
competition . . . . [T]rademark law should serve to discourage brand 
fetishism.”). 
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012). 
47. For a notorious example of a case making this move, see Anheuser-Busch, 
Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994) (enjoining depiction of 
Michelob trademarks in a comedic setting). 
48. Compare, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913 
(C.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that depiction of trademarked bulldozer unlikely 
to cause consumer confusion), with Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. New Line 
Prods., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Minn. 1998) (enjoining use of movie 
title Dairy Queens because it may cause consumer confusion). 
49. Compare, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors for Louisiana State Univ. Agric. and 
Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that use of university color schemes in apparel sales was infringing), with 
Univ. of Alabama Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (holding that artistic depiction of university trademarks and 
sport uniforms was not infringing). 
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012) (allowing litigation against mark uses that are 
likely to cause dilution by blurring or tarnishment). 
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expense, these expansions are increasingly rooted in precedent.51 And 
some stretching of traditional doctrine can, moreover, be justified with 
an eye to consumer-protection rationales. Or at least trademark owners 
have been able to generate plausible sounding, if empirically debatable, 
stories.52 Other expansions, however, have been more overtly about 
protecting seller interests without regard to consumer benefits.53 
While hardly standing against the tide, courts have produced a 
body of law that generally grasps that too much trademark protection 
is a bad thing. Many opinions recognize that trademark protection 
 
51. Compare, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory 
L.J. 367, 372 (1999) (“[M]any courts and commentators succumbed to 
‘property mania’—the belief that expanded trademark protection was 
necessarily desirable so long as the result could be characterized as 
‘property.’”), with Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the 
Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 547, 553 (2006) 
(arguing that “propertization” trend is in part an outgrowth of judges’ 
attempting to implement trademark law’s traditional concern with 
protecting the goodwill of the trademark holder). 
52. The expansion of trademark rights to the sponsorship context is one 
example. One rationale has been the notion that consumers will punish the 
trademark holder in its home market if consumers encounter, and have a 
bad experience with, the mark in another market. Notwithstanding the 
intuitive appeal of this reasoning, empirical research casts some doubt on 
this proposition. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning 
Mark(et)s, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 137, 140–41 (2010) (“[T]he empirical evidence 
confirms both that third parties can benefit from uses of known marks in 
markets ancillary to the senior mark owner’s and that those third-party uses 
can impair the senior user’s ability to expand its own product lines. Put 
another way, the evidence suggests that third parties like Black & Decker 
might benefit from use of, or proximity to, SUM’s trademarks, but not that 
SUM is harmed by such use.”). 
53. See, e.g., Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 
510 F.2d 1004, 1011 (5th Cir. 1975) (acknowledging that acceptance of 
trademark holder’s claim of right to control market in merchandise based on 
mark “may slightly tilt the trademark laws from the purpose of protecting 
the public to the protection of the business interests of plaintiffs”). 
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should not be at the expense of market competition,54 useful consumer 
information,55 or free expression.56 
Trademark cases, therefore, involve the balancing of amorphous 
comparables. Courts weigh plaintiff interests in protecting trademark 
meanings from appropriation against the risk that protection will im-
pede competition, remove useful information from circulation, and 
threaten non-market interests like freedom of expression. 
2. Interconnected Meaning 
Questions about the proper scope of trademark law are partly about 
defining the meanings that should be protected on the trademark 
holder’s behalf. The fact that trademark law protects against source 
confusion does not answer the question of whether it should also police, 
for example, sponsorship confusion. Some of these non-source meanings 
have an independent historical basis for claiming protection, but they 
are sometimes linked to traditional arguments for protecting source 
information.57 It is difficult, moreover, to separate protection of a 
 
54. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 
(2000) (“Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition 
with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design 
ordinarily serves by a rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit 
against new entrants based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness. How easy 
it is to mount a plausible suit depends, of course, upon the clarity of the 
test for inherent distinctiveness.”). 
55. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1180 
(9th Cir. 2010) (“It is the wholesale prohibition of nominative use in domain 
names that would be unfair. It would be unfair to merchants seeking to 
communicate the nature of the service or product offered at their sites. And 
it would be unfair to consumers, who would be deprived of an increasingly 
important means of receiving such information.”). 
56. See, e.g., Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989) (creating 
balancing test to insulate expressive uses of trademarks from liability because 
“overextension of Lanham Act restrictions in the area of titles might intrude 
on First Amendment values, we must construe the Act narrowly to avoid 
such a conflict”). 
57. This linkage is rhetorically effective because source identification is the 
historical core of trademark law. The principle defines what a trademark is. 
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining a trademark as used “to identify 
and distinguish” goods “from those manufactured or sold by others and to 
indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown”); 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 9 (Am. Law Inst. 
1995) (“A trademark is a word, name, symbol, device, or other designation, 
or a combination of such designations, that is distinctive of a person’s goods 
or services and that is used in a manner that identifies those goods or services 
and distinguishes them from the goods or services of others. A service mark 
is a trademark that is used in connection with services.”); id. cmt. d (noting 
that early trademark cases were “actions on the case in the nature of deceit. 
The issue in each case was whether the defendant had imitated the plaintiff’s 
mark for the purpose of misrepresenting the defendant’s goods as those of the 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 1·2016 
Thick Marks, Thin Marks 
27 
trademark’s source-identifying function—the traditional “core” of 
trademark law—from broader considerations of brand identity. The 
problem is that trademarks simultaneously embody a range of related 
information. Peripheral meanings are built out of, or at least flow from, 
the core. The Lanham Act offers little help with line drawing, as it does 
not offer clear distinctions on the level of protection to be given 
trademark meanings as one moves from the core to the periphery.58 This 
problem is fundamental to trademark law, as it has long held the 
simultaneous, and sometimes clashing, goals of protecting consumers 
while also defending a trademark owner’s “goodwill,” but it also appears 
in more modern protections of extended trademark meanings. 
a. Goodwill 
Trademark owners naturally try to imbue their marks with mean-
ings that go beyond simple source identification.59 Protecting these 
additional meanings is often justified as part of the trademark’s search-
cost-reducing function. The mark efficiently embodies not only source 
information, but also data about the product generated by its seller. 
For that information to be meaningful, it must be attached to a symbol 
with a stable meaning.60 This economization of information costs only 
works if the mark is capable of identifying source.61 If so, the trademark 
 
plaintiff. These actions eventually evolved into a distinct tort of ‘passing off,’ 
or ‘unfair competition’ as it came to be known in the United States.”). 
58. These distinctions are absent from either 15 U.S.C. § 1114 or §1125(a). The 
latter, moreover, places confusion of “origin” on equal footing (except in word 
order) with “sponsorship” and “approval.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012). 
59. Heymann, supra note 43, at 391–92 (distinguishing between a trademark’s 
denotative, connotative, and associative functions). 
60. See, e.g., Jeremy Sheff, Biasing Brands, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1245, 1255 
(2011) (“Where [trademark] protection is present, we expect that producers 
will assume the costs of disseminating information about the unobservable 
qualities of their products through promotion of their trademarks, with the 
understanding that consumers will associate that information with the 
products bearing the producer’s trademark . . . .”). 
61. Id. (“In this way, information about the unobservable qualities of products 
will be made available to consumers at a lower cost than if the consumers 
were compelled to seek out that information for themselves every time they 
wished to make a purchase.”); see also id. at 1256–58 (providing a 
hypothetical example of this process at work). This account is tied to an 
optimistic view of the workings of trademarks in the marketplace as conveyers 
of information that allow consumers to satisfy preference. An extensive 
parallel literature exists on the ways trademarks can be used to distort the 
market outcomes as compared to a competitive ideal. See, e.g., id. at 1314 
(arguing that in some contexts “the psychological effects of trademarks may 
give rise to a divergence between objective evidence and subjective consumer 
beliefs and preferences—a phenomenon I have labeled brand bias. In such 
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facilitates the development of goodwill with consumers, and the 
trademark may then embody that goodwill. 
Trademark law has always been clearer in declaring that goodwill 
merits protection than in defining the term.62 One older effort calls it 
“that which makes tomorrow’s business more than an accident. It is the 
reasonable expectation of future patronage based on past satisfactory 
dealings.”63 Its protection has long been seen as one of trademark law’s 
basic functions even as its precise contours have been amorphous.64 
However venerable, the concept presents complications in appli-
cation. Once courts decide that goodwill is something to protect, they 
may do so without interrogating the assumption that “use” of goodwill 
by someone other than the trademark holder demands a remedy. Some 
such uses have a zone of safety. The slogan, “Don’t get scroogled,” for 
example, in some sense uses Google’s goodwill.65 The use is not 
actionable because trademark doctrine generally recognizes that 
comparative advertising facilitates market competition. To incur lia-
bility, there needs to be some kind of independent wrongdoing, like a 
falsehood in the comparison.66 In other realms, where the conduct in  
situations, strategic behavior by sellers can generate welfare losses, which may 
overwhelm trademark protection’s positive welfare effects.”). 
62. See generally, Note, An Inquiry into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 Colum. L. 
Rev. 660, 661 (1953) (“[T]he three ideas which are in some way vaguely 
associated with [goodwill]: (1) excess value, (2) favorable customer relations, 
and (3) the privilege of continuance.”). 
63. 1 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 2:17 (quoting Edward S. Rogers, Good 
Will, Trademarks and Unfair Trading 13 (1914)); cf. Newark Morning 
Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 555–56 (1993) (tax case explaining 
that “[a]lthough the definition of goodwill has taken different forms over the 
years, the shorthand description of goodwill as ‘the expectancy of continued 
patronage,’ provides a useful label with which to identify the total of all the 
imponderable qualities that attract customers to the business” (citing Boe v. 
Comm’r, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962)). 
64. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 51, at 549 (“It is customary to refer to trademark 
law as protecting a seller’s goodwill in its mark. This familiar and well-
accepted proposition has been part of the law since the latter half of the 
nineteenth century.”). 
65. Scroogled is a Microsoft advertising campaign comparing the company’s 
search service to Google’s. Scroogled!, Microsoft, http://www.scroogled 
.com [https://perma.cc/5DVC-ZGEM] (last visited Sept. 21, 2016); see also, 
e.g., Charlie Osborne, Microsoft Launches ‘Don’t get Scroogled’ Campaign 
Against Google, ZDNet (Feb. 7, 2013, 8:49 AM), http:// 
www.zdnet.com/microsoft-launches-dont-get-scroogled-campaign-against- 
google-7000010965/ [https://perma.cc/8CU2-HGVN]. 
66. See Smith v. Chanel, 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968) (explaining that 
equivalence to trademarked product is not a trademark harm); Chanel, Inc. 
v. Smith, 528 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976) (explaining that falsely asserting 
equivalence may be enjoined under false advertising law). Or one might say 
that others are free to add to or use the connotative meaning so long as they 
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question is less commonplace, courts may more easily fall into the trap 
of assuming that goodwill appropriation necessarily means trademark 
infringement.67 
Goodwill is also a capacious concept. Positive consumer associations 
with COCA-COLA are partly due to the soda’s combination of taste 
and cost, but they are also the product of advertising and experience. 
The hazy memory (or was it in a commercial?) of one’s mother giving 
the sweet reward of a soda after a successful trip to the dentist is 
information created in large part by someone other than the trademark 
holder.68 But the claims to control them fit within a long-lived doctrinal 
box that courts have difficulty ignoring. It is also the case that the 
sentiment, “this is a feeling of childhood in the form of the soda that 
you remember from childhood” is built out of a reference to traditional 
trademark source. The meanings are conceptually distinct, but related 
enough to seem like something that belongs under trademark holder 
control. 
b. Other Extended Meanings 
Other extended trademark meanings are also rooted in source iden-
tification.69 For example, a mark’s persuasion function—another po-
tential object of protection70—is based on source insofar as persuasion  
do not interfere with the denotative function. See Heymann, supra note 43, 
at 392–94. 
67. See, e.g., Michael Grynberg, The Road Not Taken: Initial Interest Confusion, 
Consumer Search Costs, and the Challenge of the Internet, 28 Seattle U. 
L. Rev. 97 (2004) (arguing that the initial interest confusion doctrine took a 
wrong turn and became overly expansive due to a misguided emphasis on 
trademark goodwill rather than consumer search costs and consumer interests 
more generally). 
68. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the 
Advertising Age, 108 Yale L.J. 1717, 1734 (1999) (“The building of a brand 
that becomes its own product is a collaborative undertaking; the investment 
of both dollars and imagination flows both ways. There is no particularly good 
reason to adopt a rule permitting the producers of the brands to arrogate all 
of that collaboratively created value to themselves.”). 
69. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as 
Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397, 400–02 
(1990); id. at 413–14. 
70. This was part of Schechter’s famous argument for dilution doctrine. 
[T]oday the trademark is not merely the symbol of good will but often 
the most effective agent for the creation of good will, imprinting upon 
the public mind an anonymous and impersonal guaranty of satisfaction, 
creating a desire for further satisfactions. The mark actually sells the 
goods. And, self-evidently, the more distinctive the mark, the more 
effective is its selling power. 
 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. 
L. Rev. 813, 819 (1927); see also Beebe, supra note 22, at 2044 (“[Schechter] 
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must be directed at something.71 And all roads lead back to source 
identification insofar as a mark, no matter how used, loses protection 
whenever it loses the ability to identify source.72 Courts may therefore 
rationalize their protection of extended meaning as necessary to 
preserve a mark’s source signal.73  
The merchandising right is another example. In a merchandising 
case, the mark is the object of purchase. Consumers want the mark qua 
mark as a feature of the item to which it is attached, e.g., a college 
sweatshirt or a favorite team’s baseball cap. They are not using the 
mark to perform a source-identifying function.74 Having a Red Sox cap 
is the end, rather than having a cap manufactured by the team. 
 
recognized what empirical work has since demonstrated: that consumers will 
pursue distinctiveness, even ‘meaningless differentiation,’ for its own sake.” 
(quoting Gregory S. Carpenter et al., Meaningful Brands from Meaningless 
Differentiation: The Dependence on Irrelevant Attributes, 31 J. Marketing 
Res. 339, 340 (1994))). 
71. To be sure, persuasion may precede source as a conceptual matter. Rights 
in a mark sometimes precede bona fide use with a good or service. See, e.g., 
15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (providing for intent-to-use applications); Chance v. 
Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e hold that 
the totality of the circumstances must be employed to determine whether a 
service mark has been adequately used in commerce so as to gain the 
protection of the Lanham Act.”); T.A.B. Sys. v. Pactel Teletrac, 77 F.3d 
1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“It is well settled that one may ground one’s 
opposition to an application on the prior use of a term in a manner analogous 
to service mark or trademark use. Such an ‘analogous use’ opposition can 
succeed, however, only where the analogous use is of such a nature and 
extent as to create public identification of the target term with the opposer’s 
product or service.” (citations omitted)). Uses that precede sales will 
generally, however, still be tied to a product. See Chance, 242 F.3d. at 1159 
(noting that application of totality of circumstances approach should 
consider whether the activity “was sufficiently public to identify or 
distinguish the marked service in an appropriate segment of the public mind 
as those of the holder of the mark [and whether] the scope of the non-sales 
activity relative to what would be a commercially reasonable attempt to 
market the service[.]”) (emphases added). Even where this is true, however, 
the need to distinguish the source is never far behind. 
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (stating that a mark is abandoned when any act 
or omission by owner causes it to “lose its significance as a mark”). 
73. The cause of action for dilution has been justified, for example, as a way to 
protect a mark’s search-cost-lowering function. Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 
F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.). 
74. This is acknowledged by the leading case establishing the merchandising 
right. See Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 
Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The difficulty with this case stems 
from the fact that a reproduction of the trademark itself is being sold, 
unattached to any other goods or services. The statutory and case law of 
trademarks is oriented toward the use of such marks to sell something other 
than the mark itself.”). 
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The cases promoting and applying this right are often (and, in my 
view, correctly) criticized as detrimental to consumer interests.75 That 
said, the logo that serves as the product (and embodies information 
regarding fandom, purchaser identity, or the like) is the same logo that 
performs the source-identifying function in other contexts. That overlap 
complicates doctrine. It may create the misimpression that withholding 
protection from one class of meanings threatens the mark’s overall 
ability to function. While it is true that if a mark loses its ability to 
identify source it may lose some of its other capabilities (e.g., its 
persuasive power to sell), the reverse is not. One could limit a mark’s 
extended meaning, e.g. the merchandising signal, without threatening 
its source-identifying capability. Overlapping meaning may nonetheless 
create the impression for judges that refusing protection to one 
threatens the other.76 
So it was that the Ninth Circuit turned back an aesthetic func-
tionality challenge to the merchandising right in Au-Tomotive Gold, 
Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.77 The case involved the market for 
complementary car products. Some consumers want their automotive 
accessories to display the same trademarks as their cars, such as a 
keychain with the VW logo for use with one’s Volkswagen car.78 The 
defendants sought to fill the niche, drawing a challenge from the 
markholders, who otherwise would have the market to themselves. 
The defendants argued that they used the plaintiffs’ trademarks as 
raw product material and not as source identifiers. Consumers bought 
the marks as an aesthetic feature of the products and not because they 
thought that the accessories shared the same source as their cars.79 
 
75. See, e.g., Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 
918 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Interpreted expansively, Boston Hockey holds that a 
trademark’s owner has a complete monopoly over its use, including its 
functional use, in commercial merchandising. But our reading of the 
Lanham Act and its legislative history reveals no congressional design to 
bestow such broad property rights on trademark owners.” (citation 
omitted)). But see Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An 
Analysis of the Merchandising for Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 
603, 634–35 (1984) (suggesting reasons that merchandising output is 
unlikely to be curtailed notwithstanding monopoly situation). We might 
argue that the course is especially problematic where these consumers are 
often the fans who played a role in developing the cachet of the mark in the 
first instance. See supra note 68. 
76. For a longer discussion of this point, see Michael Grynberg, Things Are 
Worse Than We Think: Trademark Defenses in a “Formalist” Age, 24 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 897, 920–23 (2009). 
77. Au-Tomotive Gold v. Volkswagen of Am., 457 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2006). 
78. Id. at 1065. 
79. The products, moreover, were in many cases labeled as not necessarily being 
affiliated with the plaintiffs. Id. at 1065. 
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Stated another way, the marks were a functional feature of the products 
and should not be protected when acting in that capacity.80 The Ninth 
Circuit rejected the argument, reasoning that the feature claimed as 
functional also served as a source identifier when used to sell the cars 
for which defendant’s products were accessories.81 Because the aesthetic 
information was built out of a source identifier, the court feared that 
making it available would undermine the viability of the marks.82 
Au-Tomotive Gold reflects a paradox about trademarks. 
Trademarks offer a stable receptacle into which meaning may be de-
posited. Trademark owners take advantage of that ability and then lay 
claim to extended meanings for which they are often only (if even) co-
creators. Markholders nonetheless claim that they have exclusive rights 
to the extended meaning (e.g., ownership of the merchandising 
market)83 or that protection of the extended meaning is necessary to 
protect the core (e.g., the dilution cause of action’s notion that even 
non-confusing unauthorized uses must be stopped lest they “blur” a 
trademark’s source-identifying capacity). Such efforts at restriction in-
terfere with the ability of third parties to imbue marks with extended 
meanings of their own or take advantage of positive externalities that 
come from the creation of a source-identifying mark.84 
Trademark law recognizes this to some extent, as reflected by the 
mixed record of trademark holders’ efforts to claim extended meanings. 
The overlap and interdependence of meanings embodied by trademarks 
 
80. Functional marks are not protectable. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2012). 
Courts are generally more comfortable entertaining functionality arguments 
with respect to features that directly affect the physical performance of the 
good in question than they are with those affecting the aesthetic appeal. In 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., the Supreme Court signaled 
that the claim requires a showing of competitive need, in contrast to the rule 
where the feature in question has utilitarian functionality. 532 U.S. 23, 32–33 
(2001) (“It is proper to inquire into a significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage in cases of esthetic functionality . . . . Where the design is 
functional under the [first] formulation there is no need to proceed further to 
consider if there is a competitive necessity for the feature.” (citations and 
internal quotations omitted)). Aesthetic functionality claims generally fall on 
skeptical ears. 1 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 7:80. The Au-Tomotive Gold 
court treated the defendants’ claim as one of aesthetic, rather than utilitarian, 
functionality. 457 F.3d at 1074. 
81. Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1074 (“[T]he alleged aesthetic function is 
indistinguishable from and tied to the mark’s source-identifying nature.”). 
82. Id. at 1064 (“Accepting [defendant’s] position would be the death knell for 
trademark protection.”). 
83. The Au-Tomotive Gold court gave that interest broad protection through 
the use of a broad, post-sale, confusion-based theory. 457 F.3d at 1077–78. 
84. See infra Part III.A.  
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nonetheless complicates efforts to restrict trademark rights to source 
and immediately adjacent meanings.85 
C. Thick Marks, Thin Marks 
This Section describes how judicial calibrations of trademark 
thickness resolve questions of which mark meanings to protect. Judges 
inclined to limit trademark rights may do so by giving them thin pro-
tection, but the approach often masks a deeper uncertainty regarding 
the proper reach of trademark law. The resulting pro-defendant rulings 
often leave the undergrowth of doctrine—which enabled the broad 
claim in the first place—intact. 
1. Thin Marks 
As explained above,86 judges calibrate thickness of protection all the 
time in ordinary infringement cases. The multifactor test considers, for 
example, the market proximity of the parties’ goods or services. The 
closer the markets, the more likely consumers are to perceive a 
connection between the similar marks, or so trademark law assumes. 
When the markets are not proximate, other factors become more 
important. Thus, a court might require greater similarity between 
marks when the goods are not competing than when they are. In other 
words, a plaintiff’s mark has more power and is thicker the closer the 
defendant’s market is to the plaintiff’s.87 Likewise, by declaring a mark 
strong,88 a court puts a thumb on the scale in favor of liability by 
reference to mark-specific characteristics rather than external context.89 
 
85. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text. 
86. See supra Part I.A. 
87. The reverse is also true. The more similar the marks (and the stronger the 
mark) the greater scope the court will give in determining proximity. Katz 
v. Modiri, 283 F. Supp. 2d 883, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Competitive proximity 
is also to be measured in light of the first two Polaroid factors—the stronger 
the mark and the greater the similarity between the two marks, the broader 
protection it deserves.” (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 
818 F.2d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 1987)); cf. Mobil Oil Corp., 818 F.2d at 258 (“The 
unparalleled strength of Mobil’s mark demands that it be given broad 
protection against infringers.”). 
88. To be sure, strength incorporates some external context insofar as acquired 
distinctiveness is relevant to determining a mark’s strength, but this is 
context that is independent of the encounter with the defendant’s mark. 
89. Courts may also calibrate thickness of protection to reflect trial outcomes. 
Once a defendant has been judged to have infringed a mark, the remedy 
crafted by the court may demand future activities keep a “safe distance” 
from the plaintiff’s mark. The senior user has thicker protection against the 
defendant than would have been the case but for the prior infringement. See, 
e.g., Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N2G Distrib. Inc., 763 F.3d 524, 543–46 
(6th Cir. 2014) (upholding an injunction against marks “confusingly similar” 
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Courts use this concept of thick and thin protection in more inter-
esting ways. It may serve as a back-door way to restrict trademark 
subject matter by providing an avenue for a court to limit protection 
by only enjoining near duplicates of the mark.90  
to plaintiff’s and agreeing that establishing a violation does not require 
demonstration of a likelihood of confusion). 
90. This is analogous to descriptions of thin copyrights. When a copyright is thin 
it receives full protection, but casts a smaller shadow. In Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. 
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., the Supreme Court described the copyright in 
factual compilations as “thin” in that the facts within the compilation are free 
to copy, but the precise arrangement (assuming originality) is protected. 499 
U.S. 340, 349 (1991). In a case concerning a factual compilation, infringement 
would therefore require near identity. 
 In his treatise on copyright, William Patry argues that this does not mean 
that thin protection is less protection. 3 William F. Patry, Patry on 
Copyright § 9:95 (2007). Beginning with a quote of the Nimmer treatise, 
Patry argues:  
Another erroneous test is “supersubstantial similarity:”  
 The measure of how substantial a ‘substantial similarity’ must be 
made vary according to the circumstances. For many, copyrights 
represent significant creative effort, and are therefore reasonably 
robust, whereas others reflect only scant creativity; the Supreme 
Court labels the latter ‘thin.’ It would seem to follow analytically 
that the more similarity is required when less protectible matter is 
at issue. Thus, if substantial similarity is the normal measure 
required to demonstrate infringement, ‘supersubstantial similarity’ 
must pertain when dealing with ‘thin’ works.  
This approach misapprehends the basic issue of infringement. When Feist 
spoke of “thin” copyrights, it was referring to determining the amount of 
protectible material, not to the level of similarity required to prove 
infringement of that material for originality purposes. The level of 
similarity required to prove infringement is the same for every class of 
work—namely, substantial similarity of expression. If a defendant has 
copied nonprotectible material only, or a de minimis amount of expression, 
there is no infringement. On the other hand, if a defendant has copied a 
substantial amount of expression from a work having a “thin” copyright, 
infringement occurs. The error in the supersubstantiality test is that it 
confuses copyrightability with infringement and in the process misleads 
courts into requiring a higher level of similarity in expression; it further 
leads courts . . . to also misapprehend the nature of originality. 
 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 
Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03[A][2][b][4] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.)); id. 
§ 3:68 (“If a work has a thin copyright, it has a thin copyright because of a 
low level of originality (whether through a minimal level of selection, 
coordination, or arrangement or through a minimal addition of original 
material). Infringement can take place only if there is substantial similarity 
between those low elements and defendant’s work. The low level of originality 
may well make this unlikely as a fact matter, but it is wrong to require 
anything other than ordinary substantial similarity in expression between any 
two works.”). 
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Trade dress cases often unfold in this manner. Since the Lanham 
Act’s passage, trademark law has expanded to afford more stable 
protection for product packaging and, with some restrictions, design.91 
While trade dress may signal source, its protection presents two pro-
blems. First, assessing whether the dress performs a trademark function 
in the first instance is sometimes challenging. Consumers may see the 
claimed features as doing something else, particularly in cases involving 
product design.92 The second issue involves the prospect that the 
trademark is claimed not to protect source identification, but to 
preclude competitors from utilizing useful features.93 
Courts may address both concerns directly, as they go to the 
threshold question of trademark validity. These issues may nonetheless 
bleed into the infringement inquiry, particularly if the court is unsure 
whether the proposed trade dress is distinctive and not functional. As  
 The same tension appears in thinking about thin protection for a trademark. 
As with a protected work in copyright, the object embodying the trademark 
may have both protected and unprotected elements. This raises the question 
of what we mean when we say a mark is thin. Is it that the trademarked 
aspects of the object receive less protection than would a mark that did not 
incorporate unprotected matter? Or is it that the protected aspects receive 
the same protection that they would as a stand-alone mark, but their 
protection just looks weak because they coexist with unprotected matter? 
 To some extent choosing a view is impossible given that the process by which 
courts approach infringement defies this level of specificity. They are 
addressing a fact-intensive, contextual question: are consumers likely to be 
confused by a particular activity? They do so without making explicit 
underlying premises of what precisely is being protected. In any case, either 
way of describing thin protection accommodates the definitions given in this 
Article, which focus on the importance of distinguishing context to the courts. 
91. The evolution is discussed in the concurrences to Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco 
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776–87 (1992) (Stevens, J. & Thomas, J. 
concurring). The Court later held that product design must have secondary 
meaning before it may be considered protectable trade dress. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
92. This concern helped drive the Supreme Court’s ruling in Wal-Mart, which 
(as noted infra note 100) increased the difficulty of securing trademark 
protection for product design by ruling that product design is never 
inherently distinctive; those seeking a mark must always establish secondary 
meaning. The Court assumed consumers will not naturally link design with 
source identification. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213 (“Consumers are aware of 
the reality that, almost invariably, even the most unusual of product 
designs—such as a cocktail shaker shaped like a penguin—is intended not to 
identify the source, but to render the product itself more useful or more 
appealing.”).  
93. This concern also contributed to the Wal-Mart outcome. Id. at 214 
(“Competition is deterred, however, not merely by successful suit but by 
the plausible threat of successful suit, and given the unlikelihood of 
inherently source-identifying design, the game of allowing suit based upon 
alleged inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle.”). 
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a result, the analysis is sometimes partially deferred for infringement 
analysis. 
For example, Best Cellars, Inc. v. Wine Made Simple, Inc.94 con-
sidered whether a wine store’s interior design was infringed by a com-
petitor’s decor.95 The claim was an awkward one for several reasons. To 
the extent a store sells an experience as well as a product, the store 
features could be seen as product as much as packaging. On this logic, 
the plaintiff should have to prove secondary meaning.96 Fortunately for 
the plaintiff, the Supreme Court had already treated restaurant design 
as a form of packaging rather than design.97 
That still left the question of whether the plaintiff’s combination of 
features was distinctive,98 and, if so, if the effort to trademark them 
would fence off useful functional features from competitors.99 Such 
 
94. 320 F. Supp. 2d 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
95. Id.  
96. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 216. 
97. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). Wal-Mart gave 
the Court a chance to revisit this decision, which upheld a ruling that said 
design was inherently distinctive. It declined. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 215 
(contending that restaurant decor at issue in Two Pesos “seems to us not to 
constitute product design. It was either product packaging—
which . . . normally is taken by the consumer to indicate origin—or else some 
tertium quid that is akin to product packaging and has no bearing on the 
present case[.]”). 
98. The claimed features were related to: 
[T]he total effect of the interior design of its store, which [Best Cellars] 
describes as: (1) eight words differentiating taste categories; (2) eight colors 
differentiating taste categories; (3) eight computer manipulated images 
differentiating taste categories; (4) taste categories set above display fixtures 
by order of weight; (5) single display bottles set on stainless-steel wire 
pedestals; (6) square 4”x4” cards with verbal descriptions of each wine 
(“shelf talkers”) with text arranged by template; (7) shelf talkers positioned 
at eye level, below each display bottle; (8) bottles vertically aligned in rows 
of nine; (9) storage cabinets located beneath vertically aligned bottled; (10) 
materials palette consisting of light wood and stainless steel; (11) mixture of 
vertical racks and open shelving display fixtures; (12) no fixed aisles; (13) 
bottles down and back-lit; and (14) limited selection (approximately 100) of 
relatively inexpensive wine. 
 Best Cellars, Inc. v. Wine Made Simple, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 60, 70 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (record citation omitted). 
99. The defendants made both contentions, arguing: 
[T]hat certain of these elements are functional (such as arranging wines 
by taste category, color coding categories, presenting categories under a 
sign, posting index-card descriptions of each wine, stocking a limited 
number of wines, storing wine in cabinets beneath wine racks and the 
absence of fixed aisles), and that other elements are of such widespread 
use in wine stores that they are generic (such as storing wine bottles 
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claims may be hard to resolve at the early stages of litigation,100 and 
the district court decided that there was little it could do with the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss the case on distinctiveness or func-
tionality grounds.101 
The plaintiff thus established an inherently distinctive dress 
because its design elements “as combined, make up a distinct and ar-
bitrary total visual image to consumers.”102 Aware of the problem its 
ruling created, however, the court cautioned that the plaintiff would 
have only a narrow scope of protection: 
[W]hile the emphasis on specific combinations and total visual 
impact makes it relatively easy for a plaintiff to meet the inherent 
distinctiveness aspect of the trade dress infringement test, the 
same emphasis makes it correspondingly difficult for a plaintiff to 
prove likelihood of confusion. That is because defendant-
competitors who have some similar elements as well as 
noteworthy dissimilar elements in their trade dress may be able 
to show that the specific combination of elements that they use 
also constitutes protectable trade dress, and that consumers are 
unlikely to confuse the two products, or in this case, the two 
stores.103 
 
horizontally in racks, using a single bottle on display, and placing 
informational point-of-sale cards at a uniform height). 
 Id. (record citations omitted). 
100. This is one reason to tighten eligibility requirements for trade dress. The 
difficulty of making determinations of inherent distinctiveness with respect 
to product design influenced the Supreme Court’s analysis in Wal-Mart. 
Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 214. The Court likewise noted that the ability to 
attack claimed marks as embodying functional design did not nullify the in 
terrorem effect of threatening litigation. Id. (“Competition is deterred, 
however, not merely by successful suit but by the plausible threat of 
successful suit[.]”). 
101. Best Cellars, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (“While certain articulated elements are 
well-designed and thus functional for the purpose of retail wine sales, such as 
posting point-of-sale cards at a height where they can be easily read by the 
average height shopper, or storing wines in a cabinet positioned so low on a 
wall that using that space for display would be impractical, that does not 
mean that those elements are to be excluded from a specifically articulated 
trade dress. By the same logic, simply because certain elements are used in 
other wine shops, such as storing wine horizontally in racks or presenting one 
display bottle per wine does not mean that those elements must be removed 
from the overall impression because they are ‘generic.’”). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 72 (citation omitted). The court accordingly ruled that the 
infringement issue could not be resolved at the summary judgment stage. 
Id. at 81. 
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This approach to protection, if applied properly, leaves the generic and 
functional elements of Best Cellars’s mark in the public domain for 
others to use.104 
2. Thickness Calibration as Doctrinal Avoidance 
 Calibrating a trademark’s scope allows judges to manage expansive 
trademark claims while leaving underlying doctrine ambiguous.105 Two 
examples of courts employing this method to different ends follow. 
 
104. It also addresses the problem of trademark scope created by the separation 
of the validity and infringement inquiries. Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. 
McKenna, Scope, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2197, 2267 (2016) (“Because 
the law has separated validity, infringement, and defenses, generally 
considering each of them in isolation from the others, IP owners can and 
regularly do seek to expand the scope of their IP rights beyond permissible 
bounds.”). In their view, the problem is best addressed by providing some 
sort of integrated proceeding designed to address the proper reach of the IP 
right. Id. (“IP law needs a way to expressly consider scope in a single, 
integrated proceeding. Courts should coordinate validity, infringement, and 
defense proceedings in some way so that both the fact of overreaching and 
its potential consequences become clear to the parties and the court before 
trial.”). 
105. This Section focuses on ways in which judges adjust thickness of protection 
in applying trademark doctrine. The thickness metaphor may also be applied 
to describe the underlying doctrines that curtail the scope of trademark 
rights. For example, the Rogers test prevents trademark’s spillover into 
protected speech by protecting expressive uses so long as they do not strongly 
suggest involvement by the trademark holder. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 
994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). Use of a mark in the title of an expressive work will 
not be deemed infringing if the title is artistically relevant to the work and 
does not “explicitly mislead[] as to the source or the content of the work.” 
Id. Rogers has been applied beyond titles to general uses of marks within 
artistic works. See, e.g., E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 
547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008). One could describe this as taking a 
limited view of the amount of protectable information embodied by the 
trademark. The University of Alabama football program, for example, has 
the right to control the source meaning of its marks and its merchandising 
information, but it cannot prevent expressive and referential uses of use its 
marks unless more is done to suggest a connection to the markholder. Univ. 
of Ala. Bd. of Trustees v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278–79 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (applying Rogers to “readily conclude that [defendant’s] paintings, 
prints, and calendars are protected” and explaining that the “depiction of 
the University’s uniforms in the content of these items is artistically relevant 
to the expressive underlying works because the uniforms’ colors and designs 
are needed for a realistic portrayal of famous scenes from Alabama football 
history”). In such cases, the cultural information of the mark is not 
considered in determining whether the source-identifying function has been 
interfered with. 
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a. Red Soles 
Louboutin shoes are known for their contrasting color scheme: 
specifically, a bright red sole paired with an otherwise black shoe.106 
Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holdings, 
Inc.107 considered the extent to which this design feature serves as a 
trademark.108 The defendant, Yves Saint Laurent (“YSL”), offered a 
shoe whose sole was red like Louboutin’s, but without the contrast, for 
the shoe was red all over. Louboutin claimed that the monochromatic 
shoe still created a likelihood of confusion.109 
The district court agreed with YSL that Louboutin’s suit threat-
ened competition by claiming functional matter.110 The Second Circuit, 
however, balked at allowing aesthetic functionality to resolve the 
case.111  
The court still would not risk a Louboutin win and found narrower 
grounds for YSL to prevail. First, the panel looked to the threshold 
question of whether Louboutin had trademark rights. Louboutin 
claimed a mark not only in the contrasting sole but any red-soled shoe 
(independent of contrast).112 The court could reject this stretch as a 
factual matter, for it depended on Louboutin’s ability to prove secon-
dary meaning. That is, Louboutin could lose on the question without a 
holding that its design was functional. Although Louboutin had ample 
evidence of secondary meaning for the contrasting sole, it was lacking 
for a shoe without it.113 Thus, Louboutin had no trademark on a 
uniformly red shoe. 
 
106. Their fame extends beyond the fashion industry to other media. See, e.g., 
Jennifer Lopez, Louboutins (Epic Records 2009) (song with chorus line 
“I’m throwing on my Louboutins”). 
107. 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
108. Id.  
109. Id. at 213. 
110. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 
445, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Awarding one participant in the designer shoe 
market a monopoly on the color red would impermissibly hinder competition 
among other participants.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, remanded sub nom, 
696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012). 
111. The court expressed concern that the district court adopted a per se rule 
declaring color to be functional within the fashion industry. In its view, doing 
so was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and generally 
unnecessary. Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 223.  
112. Id. at 212 n.1. 
113. Id. at 227–28. The court further ordered Louboutin’s registration to be 
modified accordingly. Id. at 228 (directing the PTO “to limit the registration 
of the Red Sole Mark to only those situations in which the red lacquered 
outsole contrasts in color with the adjoining ‘upper’ of the shoe.”). 
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As a doctrinal matter, however, that conclusion should not neces-
sarily be dispositive. Consumers might still believe a monochromatic 
red shoe has the same source as a shoe bearing Louboutin’s contrasting 
red sole. Moreover, under traditional doctrine, Louboutin may still have 
arguments for liability. Though a monochromatic shoe differs from one 
with a contrasting sole, they share an obvious feature. Under a standard 
analysis, that shared feature should have been all the more important 
given the commercial strength of Louboutin’s mark.114 This strength 
would normally have been expected to weigh in Louboutin’s favor, 
opening the door to analysis of contextual factors like consumer 
sophistication or evidence of actual confusion. But were a court to find 
a likelihood of confusion, all of the policy concerns animating the 
functionality arguments would return to the fore.115 
The Second Circuit ducked the problem by giving the strong mark 
thin protection.116 Rather than reach the likelihood-of-confusion issue 
or remand it to the district court for further proceedings, the panel held 
that YSL did not use the plaintiff’s mark and confusion was therefore 
impossible. The holding on the scope of the mark was conclusive as to 
likely confusion, for “the red sole on YSL’s monochrome shoes is neither 
a use of, nor confusingly similar to, the Red Sole Mark . . . . Louboutin 
could not have shown a likelihood of success on the merits in the 
absence of an infringing use of the Red Sole Mark by YSL.”117 
This disposition is curious even if one considers Louboutin’s claims 
to be overreaching. First, it appears to revive the notion that there is a 
distinct “trademark use” requirement that limits trademark claims.118 
Great. Except that the Second Circuit had already rejected a robust 
version of such a requirement.119 Second, the assumption that consumers 
could not possibly be confused by a monochromatic shoe works better 
as a normative claim (trademark law should not protect consumers from 
that kind of confusion) than it does as an empirical one, particularly 
 
114. Louboutin had extensive evidence of acquired distinctiveness through 
advertising expenditures and the like, but the best indicator was the shoe 
design’s fame. Id. at 227 (“[W]e think it plain that Louboutin’s marketing 
efforts have created what the able district judge described as ‘a . . . brand 
with worldwide recognition.’”). 
115. Even to ask the question would do so given the litigation expense of a trial 
on the merits, which would tend to have an in terrorem effect even if YSL 
ultimately prevailed. 
116. And the mark was strong insofar as it had achieved “worldwide recognition.” 
Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 227. 
117. Id. at 228. 
118. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan, Beyond Trademark Use, 8 J. on Telecomm. & 
High Tech. L. 135 (2010). 
119. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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given the evidentiary thresholds applied to plaintiffs in infringement 
cases.120 
We might explain the result by describing the panel as calibrating 
thickness of protection as a way to manage some of the policy concerns 
raised by Louboutin’s claim. Here, the mark receives thin internal 
protection (it is not enough that the color be used, but also a contrast 
is required). This limits the legally protected information of the mark. 
Part of the mark’s information content is its ability to remind people 
of Louboutin or evoke the brand. Thin protection frees that information 
by permitting use of parts of the mark.121 Calibrating protection thus 
addresses the policy issue while simplifying the litigation, eliminating 
the need to engage the complicated factual analysis of the degree to 
which a monochromatic shoe might confuse consumers. 
At the same time, something is lost. Assuming that the panel did 
indeed appreciate the potential negative spillovers of allowing 
Louboutin to effectively claim the color red for itself in the shoe 
marketplace, future litigants would have benefitted from a ruling that 
bolstered the force of the functionality doctrine. A ruling in that vein 
would have been easier to generalize beyond the specific case. 
b. Red Wax 
Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo North America, Inc.122 
functions as Louboutin’s doppelganger and shows how thickness cali-
brations may be used to promote expansive claims.123 The defendants 
(referred to collectively in the opinion and here as Cuervo), were in the 
tequila business and included the maker of Jose Cuervo tequila. Cuervo 
used a bottle top that resembles a dripping wax seal on one of its 
 
120. See, e.g., 6 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 32:185 (examining how courts 
evaluate consumer survey results to determine likelihood of consumer 
confusion). 
121. The thickness calibration also addresses the policy concern raised by the 
aesthetic functionality claim without requiring the doctrine’s invocation. 
Many sympathizing with YSL feared that success by Louboutin would have 
the effect of constraining design options in the fashion industry. Giving the 
contrasting sole thin protection ameliorates the feared prospect of fencing off 
colors. 
 The distinction made here admittedly requires a further level of parsing, for 
one could say that source-identification information is also at issue in the 
court’s refusal to engage the question of likely confusion. By saying that 
YSL’s red shoe was not a “use” of the mark suggests, however, that the court 
saw a distinction between design that signaled source and one that performed 
other functions and, by extension, embodied other forms of information. 
122. 679 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2012). 
123. Id.  
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offerings, in this case a premium brand selling for $100 per bottle.124 
Maker’s Mark, a bourbon producer, had registered a trademark in a red 
dripping wax seal.125 Maker’s Mark bourbon generally  
retails for less than $30.126 
Maker’s Mark sued for infringement. Like the Louboutin defendant, 
Cuervo raised an unsuccessful functionality defense,127 setting up the 
 
124. Id. at 417. For those, like me before reading the case, whose knowledge of 
the brand had been limited to the cheap offerings often encountered in 
college, the Jose Cuervo family of tequilas covers a range of offerings, 
including tequilas on the high end. 
125. “All bourbon is whiskey, but not all whiskey is bourbon.” Id. at 414. Tequila 
is neither. Apart from being spirits produced by distillation, bourbon and 
tequila have little in common. Bourbon is a whiskey, and therefore distilled 
from fermented grain, with a mashbill (grain recipe) of at least fifty percent 
corn that is aged in charred new oak barrels. Whiskies marketed in the 
United States as bourbon must conform to this definition. 27 CFR § 5.22 
(2016). Tequila, by contrast, is produced by distilling the blue agave plant. 
Id. It therefore is not a whiskey, not being distilled from grain. Tequila also 
has a regulated definition established by the Mexican government and 
enforced by the United States domestically. Id. (“Tequila is a distinctive 
product of Mexico, manufactured in Mexico in compliance with the laws of 
Mexico regulating the manufacture of Tequila for consumption in that 
country. . . . Tequila, imported in bottles, shall not be released from customs 
custody for consumption unless a certificate of a duly authorized official of 
the Mexican Government that the product is entitled to be designated as 
Tequila under the applicable laws and regulations of the Mexican 
Government is filed with the application for release.”). Mexican law only 
permits certain regions within the country to call their product tequila. See 
generally Cámara Nacional de la Tequila Industry, 
http://www.tequileros.org/ [https://perma.cc/ML32-AYPN] (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2016) (providing information of tequila production and sales). 
126. In this case, the court reported the price as $24. Maker’s Mark, 679 F.3d at 
424. 
127. Cuervo raised both utilitarian and aesthetic functionality arguments before 
the district court. It claimed that a wax seal is functional because it protects 
the product from contamination from outside conditions. This claim pertained 
to Cuervo’s use of the wax. The plaintiff’s wax seal was solely for aesthetic 
purposes (its bottles were secured by a twist cap adorned by the dripping 
wax. Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am. Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 
671, 684 (W.D. Ky. 2010). The district court held that Cuervo had failed to 
demonstrate “that any current wax seal users employ the method for a 
functional purpose.” Id. at 685. 
 The district court gave only a cursory treatment of the aesthetic 
functionality question. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s rejection 
of the claim: 
Even assuming we were to recognize aesthetic functionality doctrine, 
regardless of which test we would apply under that doctrine, the outcome 
is the same. Under either test, Cuervo’s appeal on this claim does not 
succeed. The district court was not convinced “that it would be difficult or 
costly for competitors to design around” the mark and we do not disagree. 
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infringement analysis. On the merits, Cuervo had strong arguments 
that confusion was unlikely. Whatever the similarity between the wax 
seals, the products had entirely different labels, listing wholly dissimilar 
house marks (MAKER’S MARK vs. JOSE CUERVO).128 Nor did the 
labels look alike, distinct word marks aside.129 Other spirit producers 
use wax seals,130 belying a claim that the plaintiff’s seal was unique. 
The goods, moreover, did not compete but were in differing spirit 
markets. There was no evidence of actual confusion, and the price tag 
of Cuervo’s premium product suggests a high degree of care and 
sophistication from purchasers under standard trademark doctrine.131 
The panel nonetheless treated the wax seal mark as thick enough 
to nullify these distinctions and trigger liability. Most importantly, the 
court discounted Cuervo’s distinguishing labels in a way that unites 
thickness of protection with the issue of what mark information receives 
protection. Although the distinguishing labels could mitigate source  
There is more than one way to seal a bottle with wax to make it look 
appealing, and so Cuervo fails the comparable alternatives test. As to the 
effective competition test, the district court found that “red wax is not the 
only pleasing color of wax . . . nor does it put competitors at a significant 
non-reputation related disadvantage to be prevented from using red 
dripping wax.” The district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, and, 
based on those findings, Cuervo fails either test. 
 Maker’s Mark, 679 F.3d at 418–19.  
128. Nonetheless, “[t]he district court found this factor ‘narrowly favor[s] Maker’s 
Mark,’ and found that, though ‘[v]ery few consumers . . . would buy one 
product believing it was the other,’ the seals were facially similar. The 
district court examined the two seals and found that ‘nothing on the 
products other than the red dripping wax . . . would suggest an association 
between the two.’” Maker’s Mark, 679 F.3d at 421.  
129. For pictures of the bottles in question, see Mark Borghese, Maker's Mark 
Locks Up Dripping Red Wax as a Trade Dress for Alcohol, Trademark 
‘Em Blog (June 22, 2012), http://trademarkem.com/makers-mark-locks-
up-dripping-red-wax-as-a-trade-dress-for-alcohol [https://perma.cc/N874-
E348]. 
130. Cuervo had argued to the district court that the mark was generic based on 
evidence of third-party use of wax seals on spirits. Maker’s Mark, 703 F. Supp. 
2d at 687. The court rejected the claim, and likewise discounted the evidence 
with respect to Cuervo’s argument that the drippling seal mark was not strong. 
Id. at 687–91. The Sixth Circuit upheld the court on this point, agreeing that 
the “evidence [was] limited and unconvincing because it concerned seals used 
on all distilled spirits; the court found that the relevant use of the seals is 
limited to the ‘relevant market,’ and not among all distilled spirits.” Maker’s 
Mark, 679 F.3d at 421. But as discussed above the line, the defendant’s market 
was not the same as the plaintiff’s either. In other words, if third party use 
does not matter to mark strength or validity in light of the fact that it occurs 
outside of Maker’s Mark’s market, then the court should have similarly 
credited Cuervo’s distance from the bourbon business. 
131. Maker’s Mark, 679 F.3d at 424. 
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confusion, the panel determined that the information being protected 
was not the mark’s source-identifying function, but rather its ability to 
convey sponsorship or affiliation information. 
First, testimony in the record indicates that many consumers are 
unaware of the affiliations between brands of distilled spirits, and 
that some companies produce multiple types of distilled spirits, 
which supports the district court’s assessment here. Second, the 
presence of a house mark, as the district court correctly noted, is 
more significant in a palming off case than in an association 
case—as the district court reasoned, in an association case “when 
the two products are related enough . . . one might associate with 
or sponsor the other and still use their own house mark.”132 
Using consumer ignorance of affiliation agreements to support a finding 
of likely actionable confusion demonstrates the thickness of protection 
given the wax seal of the plaintiff.133 The protection is strong enough to 
wipe away context indicating that confusion is unlikely. 
The ruling makes for an illuminating contrast with Louboutin. Pace 
Louboutin, the evocative power of an element of the Marker’s Mark 
trademark sufficed to render otherwise wholly distinct product 
packaging into infringing matter. But as was the case with Louboutin, 
the calibration of the mark’s thickness largely obviated the need to 
engage in a deep factual inquiry. In Louboutin, thin protection gave the 
court an excuse to avoid the likelihood of confusion analysis altogether. 
In Maker’s Mark, thick protection justified giving that analysis short 
shrift, only this time with a thumb on the scale in the plaintiff’s favor. 
The shared feature effectively put Cuervo to the task of proving that 
confusion was impossible.134 
 
132. Id. at 422. 
133. To be sure, there are cases noting that a differing word mark is not a get-out-
of-jail-free card against infringement claims (though it may suffice). 4 
McCarthy, supra note 15, § 23:53. But it is likewise the case that the fact 
that one mark calls another to mind does not suffice for an infringement 
finding. Id. § 23:9. 
134. Maker’s Mark, 679 F.3d at 423 (balancing the factors and finding that they 
“compel[] a finding of infringement”). The final balancing provides a good 
example of selective weighing and discounting of factors: 
Excluding the neutral factors, the majority of the factors—strength, 
relatedness of the goods, similarity, and marketing channels—favor 
Maker’s Mark. The district court found that Maker’s Mark’s trademark is 
“extremely strong,” and we have adopted that finding. Further, we have 
said that the ‘most important Frisch factors’ are similarity and strength of 
the mark; both of these factors favor Maker’s Mark. The “likely degree of 
purchaser care” factor “clearly” favors Cuervo. Though this factor is given 
substantial weight, this factor alone cannot override the “extreme” strength 
of the mark that, when coupled with similarity (which itself is given 
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In both cases, the calibration of protection resolved deeper policy 
questions. In Louboutin, thin protection enabled copying in the 
marketplace because it did not equate a feature’s ability to evoke a 
product as the equivalent of infringement. In Maker’s Mark, thick 
protection did the opposite. As far as the panel was concerned, to evoke 
is to infringe, making the feature off limits. One interesting consequence 
is that the Sixth Circuit’s logic makes it easier to prove an affiliation 
claim than a traditional source confusion claim notwithstanding the 
more tenuous case for consumer or seller harm.135 None of these issues 
were at the foreground of the courts’ analyses, masked largely by the 
kind of protection given to the marks in question. 
c. Of Chickens and Eggs 
The contrast between Louboutin and Maker’s Mark may have 
multiple explanations. The panels may have differing takes on proper 
trademark policy. The subject matter may have been more troubling in 
Louboutin; the risks of restricting use of the color red in the fashion 
industry may have been more obvious than analogous fears concerning 
spirit bottle tops. We might point to the home field advantage of the 
judicial circuit with jurisdiction over Kentucky’s bourbon industry. And 
so on. Accordingly, one might describe the “calibration” of trademark 
protection as simply an ex post description of other inputs into the 
courts’ decision-making. Fair enough. If true, however, it demonstrates 
the instability of modern trademark doctrine insofar as its various 
policies combine to produce an unclear picture of what judges are 
doing.136 
It is possible, however, that the information problem trademarks 
present may help both to explain the urge to provide thick protection 
and the difficulty in being consistent about its application. That is, the 
need to calibrate trademark thickness may sometimes precede, at least 
in part, the trademark policy questions that the calibration sim-
ultaneously resolves. The next Part considers this prospect. 
 
“considerable weight”), and combined with the two other factors weighing 
in favor of Maker’s Mark, together favor a finding of infringement. 
 Id. at 423 (internal citation omitted). Note how the similarity factor 
transforms from a questionable tilt in favor of the plaintiff into one of the 
primary reasons for victory. 
135. See generally Lemley & McKenna, supra note 52. 
136. Cf. Michael Grynberg, The Judicial Role in Trademark Law, 52 B.C. L. 
Rev. 1283, 1295–97 (2011). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 1·2016 
Thick Marks, Thin Marks 
46 
II. Calibrating Trademark Scope 
Why might judges accord thick protection to a mark? Belief in 
strong trademark rights aside,137 one possibility is that doing so simp-
lifies the information inquiry of a trademark case. This Part explores 
that possibility, and suggests that the impulse to simplify the 
information burdens of trademark litigation is of a piece with the urge 
to treat trademarks as a form of property. This shortcut carries costs, 
and some of the tradeoffs are considered below. 
A. The Appeal of Thick Marks 
Cases in which a mark receives thick protection look ripe for the 
accusation that judges are “propertizing” the mark. The extent to 
which this is praise or criticism is a familiar debate in trademark law. 
Of interest here, however, is the link between thick protection and the 
urge to treat trademarks as property. This Section suggests that the 
“propertization” of trademarks may appeal to judges as a way to 
simplify the information inquiries raised by trademark litigation. The 
claim is based on three points: (1) trademark cases present an infor-
mation management problem; (2) adjusting a trademark’s thickness of 
protection is an information-management device; and (3) strong pro-
perty rights may themselves be described as a response to an 
information-management problem. 
The first two points are reflected above. Trademark cases pose a 
variety of information-management issues.138 Some are present in any 
form of litigation—for example, sorting through conflicting information 
to adjudicate facts or balancing efficient decision-making against the 
risk of error.139 Judges manage information in a variety of ways, and 
several articles explain aspects of trademark doctrine as a response to 
the challenges presented by the factual complexities of a trademark 
case.140 Others, like the information embodiment problem, are more 
particular to trademark. 
As argued above, calibrating thickness of protection offers a mech-
anism to determine what information embodied by a trademark will be 
 
137. Here, we are talking about broad readings of rights in cases in which they 
are not textually compelled by the language of the Lanham Act. 
138. See supra Part I.B.1. 
139. See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 18, at 1601 (observing that “[e]mpirical studies 
of decision making generally, and of judicial decision making in particular, 
consistently show that decision makers, even when making complex 
decisions, reach their stopping threshold and make a decision after 
considering a remarkably low number of decision-relevant factors”). 
140. Id. at 1581 (presenting empirical analysis indicating that in trademark cases 
“judges employ ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics to short-circuit the multifactor 
analysis”). 
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protected.141 It simultaneously bears on another policy issue at play in 
modern trademark law—to what extent should trademarks be treated 
as a form of property with a strong exclusion right? 
Discussions (and critiques) of trademarks as property raise familiar 
arguments concerning incentive theory, notions of desert, or unjust 
enrichment (and their poor fit with trademark).142 But the extent to 
which property regimes should govern rights and duties may itself be 
described as an information-management problem.143 This might 
explain some of the appeal to judges of giving thick protection to 
trademarks. 
Henry Smith postulates that a strong property right to exclude is 
an information-management device that takes advantage of the 
principle of modularity.144 In this telling, a modular system is one in 
which interactions are frequent and complex within the component 
units (or modules), but limited and simplified between them.145 “Think 
 
141. See supra Part I.C. 
142. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 
Va. L. Rev. 2099, 2121–22 (2004) (describing critiques of trademark law 
that argue that judges inappropriately focus on unjust enrichment or 
Lockean rationales to expand trademark rights). 
143. Bone also links information management to judicial decisions that expand 
trademark rights to make them more like property, but his account focuses 
on enforcement costs, and the difficulty of adjudicating whether particular 
trademark uses create consumer harm. Managing these costs explain some 
of trademark’s expansion. Bone, supra note 142, at 2152. The account 
developed below differs in that it focuses on the interrelationships between 
the various meanings that a trademark embodies, and not on problems of 
enforcing specific trademark policies. But both accounts share the notion 
that judges may be moved to expand trademark rights to a contested area 
in the service of vindicating a less controversial goal. Id. at 2171–74 
(suggesting that post-sale confusion cases do raise concerns of trademark-
related consumer harm). 
144. See Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. 
Penn. L. Rev. 2097, 2115 (2012) (“Property law manages complexity 
through modularity.”). 
145. In Smith’s account: 
Modularity is key to managing complexity. A system is complex when it 
has many interdependencies. In a nonmodular system any change to any 
element can in principle impact another element directly, or through any 
path, however long. This pattern of dense interdependencies makes such 
systems either unpredictable if changed, or excessively rigid in order to 
avoid unpredictable change from these ripple effects. Complex systems 
often have clusters whose elements have dense and intense interactions 
among themselves but relatively sparse interactions with elements outside 
the cluster; such systems are what Herbert Simon termed “nearly 
decomposable.” A nearly decomposable system allows chunks or 
components of the system to be partially walled off and the inter-
connections between these chunks and the rest of the system to be 
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about a car,” Smith writes. “[C]hanges in the brake system mostly do 
not affect the fuel injection system and vice versa. By ruling out such 
interactions, the system is easier to understand and to modify, and less 
vulnerable to shocks.”146 
Smith has applied the modularity framework to a variety of legal 
questions.147 Most relevantly for current purposes, he argues that pro-
perty law’s right to exclude can be explained as an attempt to manage 
information via modularity.148 Its virtue, posits Smith, is its simplicity. 
We might imagine a legal rule that assigns property rights and duties 
based on broader criteria like society-wide efficiency. But doing so 
would be irreducibly complex, for one’s choices would radiate across 
society with hard-to-predict interactions with the choices of others. No 
one could easily calculate the consequences—and therefore the 
legality—of her preferred uses.149  
deliberately limited (sometimes even at the expense of interdependencies 
that might have some value). In such systems we can impose a modular 
structure that encapsulates the clusters—that is, hides much of their 
internal information—and defines the interactions of clusters through 
their interfaces. Modularity manages complexity, because the ripple effects 
of modifications to one module have more defined consequences (through 
interfaces) than they would in an unconstrained system . . . . Interactions 
and interdependencies can be intense within such modules but are defined 
and relatively sparse across the interface with other modules. The key is 
that the interface allows only certain information through; the rest is 
“hidden” in the module. 
 Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1691, 
1701 (2012) (citations omitted) (quoting Herbert A. Simon, The 
Sciences of the Artificial 210 (2d ed. 1981)). 
146. Id.; cf. id. at 1702 (noting modularity in computer science); Smith, supra 
note 144, at 2111–15 (noting applications of language of modularity to 
cognitive science, organizations, and markets). 
147. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Modularity & Morality in the Law of Torts, 4 J. 
Tort L. 1 (2011); Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and 
Information Flow, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1175 (2006). Smith’s foray into the 
intellectual property arena focuses on the incentive-based patent and 
copyright regimes (and the attendant questions of assembly of inputs for the 
creation of new works) and did not consider trademarks. Henry E. Smith, 
Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 
116 Yale L.J. 1742 (2007). For a critique of Smith’s approach, see Michael 
A. Carrier, Why Modularity Does Not (and Should Not) Explain Intellectual 
Property, 117 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 95 (2007). 
148. Smith, supra note 144, at 2115 (“The basic (rebuttable) presumption in 
property law is delegation to the owner through the right to exclude, which 
serves to economize on information costs.”). 
149. Id. at 2117 (“Property functions in part as a shortcut over all the regulations 
or bilateral contracts that would have to be devised to govern all members 
of society in all their interactions.”); cf. Smith, supra note 147148, at 1718 
(“[T]he law of trespass in its individual applications can look very arbitrary, 
unfair, and even irrational, but it permits owners the space (literally, in the 
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The right to exclude, Smith argues, masks complexities about the 
proper extent of property rights behind a simple obligation.150 One who 
encounters the property of another need not know much about the 
precise nature of the other’s rights or needs; it is enough to know to 
stay away.151 It is only in special cases that the law must develop 
calipers to delve into and manage more complicated interactions, policy 
concerns, or clashing claims of entitlement. Smith terms this alternative 
the governance model, which steps in because “many problematic 
interactions are not solvable using boundaries and are important 
enough to call for enriching the interface between property modules,” 
with the law of nuisance an example.152 Given the information costs of 
these departures, exclusion does well enough as a baseline.153 
 
case of land) to pursue projects without having to answer to others, thus 
generally promoting efficiency and liberty.”). 
150. Smith, supra note 144, at 2115 (“The exclusion strategy is the starting point 
in property, and this strategy economizes on information costs.”). On this 
telling, the right to exclude lets property law “protect a wide range of largely 
unspecified interests in use, the details of which are of no particular relevance 
to those under a duty to respect the right (in this case, by not crossing 
boundaries without the permission of the owner).” Id. 
151. Id. at 2115–16 (“In trespass to land, an unauthorized crossing of a boundary 
serves as a (very) rough proxy for harmful use; any voluntary entry into the 
space defined by the ad coelum rule counts as a trespass. ‘Keep out’ usually 
means keep out. Likewise in personal property, I know not to take a car from 
a parking lot if it is not mine and I do not have the owner’s permission; I need 
not know anything about the identity of the owner, nor whether the car is 
subject to a security interest or the subject of a bailment. Thus, to the 
nonowner, property is like a black box, a module where the type of use is 
simply irrelevant to the duty of abstention.” (citations omitted)).  
152. Smith, supra note 145, at 1714. While more sensitive to context, these 
departures raise information costs. Id. at 1717 (“If delineation cost is left out 
of the picture, it becomes deceptively attractive to move in the direction of 
more governance-style contextualized inquiry into all such matters.”). The 
reason is that they return us to the world of complex interactions that more 
modular approaches strive to avoid. Id. at 1714 (arguing that although costs 
and benefits can theoretically be weighed, “many of the considerations are 
not measurable, leading to a need for legal designers to combine rough guesses, 
presumptions that have worked in successful legal systems, and rules of thumb 
about when to look to custom as a source of law”). 
153. Id. at 1704 (“When O1 owns Blackacre, the exclusion strategy for delineating 
her rights, implemented through devices like the tort of trespass, protects a 
range of actions A1, A2, A3, . . . , without the law’s needing to specify these 
actions. Indeed, O1 may know more about the actions than anyone else. 
Action A2 may result in a nuisance to O2, who owns neighboring Whiteacre, 
and O3, who owns Greenacre. But O1 can take actions A1, A3, . . . , without 
consulting or needing to coordinate with O2 or O3. O1 can delay taking an 
action until the optimal time. In other words, the modular architecture, by 
reducing the dependency of actions A1, A3, . . . , on elements outside the 
Blackacre module, preserves options in O1. By contrast, if more of the set of 
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Smith’s framework offers a possible explanation of the appeal of 
property stories to judges. Some of the range of information embodied 
in trademarks is indisputably under the trademark holder’s control, 
some not. Each part of the range presents different policy questions and 
factual issues for a court trying to decide what should be freely available 
to third parties. Though the policy questions may be discrete, 
trademark information is often interdependent.154 Many meanings are 
built, at least in part, out of the trademark’s source-identifying 
function. Trademark law protects this information and recognizes the 
markholder as responsible for managing its meaning. By controlling the 
quality of the denoted good or service, the markholder has primacy in 
determining what the mark’s promise of quality means. It is an easy 
step to see that control as extending to other meanings, for it is unclear 
how loss of control of an extended meaning might affect the source 
signal.155 
Concealing these complex interactions under the umbrella of 
trademark ownership simplifies matters. Giving the trademark owner 
the right to exclude uses of the mark takes difficult information-regu-
lation decisions out of a court’s hands and makes them a matter of 
bilateral transactions. Complex questions (e.g., what is the effect on a 
mark’s goodwill if the same name is used on a non-competing product 
in another market) are masked by a simple inter-module com-
munication (this mark is owned by the trademark holder, if you want 
to use it, negotiate).156 There is no need to parse the precise kind of  
A1, A2, A3, . . . , depended on actions in the corresponding sets of O2 and 
O3 or yet other persons, A1 would have to be determined at a time that 
compromises between the need for decision on O1’s part and the timing of 
those other persons’ related actions. Moreover, as a thing of modular 
property, Blackacre can easily be transferred from O1 to others because 
nothing in the specification of the package makes it context-dependent on 
the status of the owner. Likewise, nonowners of Blackacre—everyone other 
than O1—have less to be on the lookout for, and need not make their 
decisions and their timing depend in any way on A1, A3, and so forth, in 
O1’s set.”). 
154. See supra Part I.B.1. 
155. For example, the story that consumers will punish trademark holders in their 
home markets if they encounter poor-quality products or services under the 
mark in a distant market has intuitive appeal, but may not be true. See 
supra note 52 (noting that empirical research does not substantiate this 
proposition). Sorting out the empirics of the matter by critically reviewing 
research on the subject may not be a welcome or easy task for judges. But 
the surface plausibility of stories like this one—not to mention the breadth 
of the modern Lanham Act’s cause of action—make it difficult for courts to 
simply accord trademarks thin protection at all times, though that approach 
might also lower information costs for judges. 
156. Just as “[p]roperty clusters complementary attributes—land’s soil nutrients, 
moisture, building support, or parts of everyday objects like chairs—into the 
parcels of real estate or tangible and intangible objects of personal property,” 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 1·2016 
Thick Marks, Thin Marks 
51 
information at issue in the particular case and suss out its relationship 
to source identification.157 
On this telling, the in terrorem effect of the uncertain scope of 
trademark rights is not a bug,158 but a feature that makes the ambiguity 
of the scope of trademark rights something more akin to a boundary. 
It thus promotes licensing negotiations that ensure the considered 
management of a mark’s embodied information. And judges need not 
grapple with the complexities of determining how use of a mark might 
threaten its ability to perform core functions. The opacity of these 
relationships justifies masking them behind the property signal. Any 
excesses on the part of trademark holders may be dealt with in a 
relatively ad hoc manner, either through the development of narrow 
doctrinal exceptions or reliance on judges exercising discretion in 
difficult cases. In short, the governance model is sometimes necessary, 
but the baseline is one of property rights.159 
This logic is the essence of thick trademark protection, treating any 
unauthorized use as presumptively infringing notwithstanding the 
distinguishing features of the use or surrounding context. It perhaps 
 
Smith, supra note 145, at 1703, so too do property stories of trademark law 
combine a mark’s denotative and connotative meanings (i.e., its source-
identifying function, goodwill, brand identity, selling power, evocation value, 
associative information, etc.) together into a single mark.  
157. And indeed, parsing through the ordinary multifactor test in an ordinary 
case may be seen as putting trademark rights at unnecessary risk, as 
Schechter argued ninety years ago: 
Any theory of trade-mark protection which . . . does not focus the 
protective function of the court upon the good-will of the owner of the 
trade-mark, inevitably renders such owner dependent for protection, not 
so much upon the normal agencies for the creation of good-will, such as 
the excellence of his product and the appeal of his advertising, as upon 
the judicial estimate of the state of the public mind. This psychological 
element is in any event at best an uncertain factor, and “the so-called 
ordinary purchaser changes his mental qualities with every judge.” 
 Frank I. Schechter, The Historical Foundations of the Law 
Relating to Trade-Marks 166 (1925). My thanks to Barton Beebe for 
bringing Schechter’s quote to my attention. 
158. See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual 
Property Law, 116 Yale L.J. 882, 913 (2007); Timothy B. Lee, In Annual 
Tradition, Advertisers Cowed by NFL Trademark Bullying, Ars Technica 
(Feb 5, 2012, 11:00 AM) (“Every year . . . a football game [is] watched by 
tens of millions of Americans. And every year, businesses launch ad campaigns 
to sell a variety of products—televisions, pizzas, soda—in conjunction with 
the game. And the overwhelming majority of these businesses avoid calling it 
the ‘Super Bowl.’”), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/02/in-annual-
tradition-advertisers-cowed-by-nfl-trademark-bullying/ 
[https://perma.cc/CD9E-9FQW]. 
159. See supra notes 152–153 and accompanying text. 
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explains cases like Maker’s Mark in which the distance of the claim 
from trademark’s core (in Maker’s Mark whether the plaintiff was not 
the source of the product but rather had some sort of affiliation with 
the defendants) was used to lower the burden of proof.160 On the logic 
of modularity, ascertaining whether consumers might see a connection 
between Maker’s Mark and Cuervo—and the effect of the perception—
is complicated. Hiding these inquiries behind the plaintiff’s ownership 
of the wax seal mark simplifies matters: Maker’s Mark manages the 
associations tied to the wax seal mark. Its assessment of whether the 
use of its mark on tequila will have negative or positive spillovers is 
communicated by a simple decision to license or not. At the same time, 
the court’s determination, rightly or wrongly, that the wax seal is not 
functional allows the property baseline to dictate the outcome. 
For its part, Louboutin could be described as another aspect of the 
modular property story. A rigid right to exclude invites abuse, but that 
abuse need not necessarily require detailed ameliorating doctrines if 
judges have the leeway to act as a safety valve where necessary.161 On 
this view, the undertheorized nature of YSL’s win becomes a virtue 
because it leaves the baseline presumptions in favor of the trademark 
holder intact while offering nothing to future defendants. It is not about 
them, for it was Louboutin that had gone too far in acting 
opportunistically to try to thwart competition in the shoe market.162 
B. The Impossibility of Thick Marks 
Whatever its explanatory power, the above account is necessarily 
incomplete. First, the property argument suffers from a number of 
defects.163 Trademark law’s conflicting impulses give judges many 
 
160. See supra notes 123–135. 
161. Smith, supra note 144, at 2127 (“Law can afford to be simple as long as it is 
backed up by equitable anti-opportunism principles.”). 
162. Henry E. Smith, Rose’s Human Nature of Property, 19 Wm. & Mary Bill 
Rts. J. 1047, 1050–51 (2011) (“To serve as a safety valve against 
opportunism, equity is a holistic mode of decision making that is not fully 
captured by rules versus standards. First of all, equity was only supposed to 
be an exception. Unlike property, it was in personam—it operated on the 
person and did not announce general rules—and concomitantly it was 
supposed to tread carefully when property rights were involved. But because, 
as Justice Story once said, ‘[f]raud is infinite’ given the ‘fertility of man’s 
invention,’ equity too needed to be open-ended, with ex post discretion and 
an irreducible vagueness.” (citations omitted)).  
163. Not least of which is the conceptual problem that property rights in words 
presents. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death 
of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687, 1696 (1999); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., 
Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 367, 373 (1999). 
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reasons to balk at the property story.164 And the purported benefits of 
propertized trademarks are hard to realize in practice. For example, a 
common critique of overly strong trademark rights is to note their 
danger to expressive interests and socially beneficial, albeit unapproved, 
uses of trademarks by third parties. In the commercial context, these 
beneficial externalities may theoretically be accounted for through 
bargaining (i.e., it is possible for those wishing to use the marks in a 
socially beneficial way to negotiate with the markholders and recover 
the costs through consumer sales), but in practice many of the gains 
are unlikely to be realized if licensing is required.165 Even if they could 
be, the terms of trademark protection, which prohibit naked licensing, 
might limit the ability of trademark holders to engage in optimal 
licensing.166 Further, one may doubt that the gains from propertizing 
information are meaningful given the incentives provided by modest 
trademark rights.167 
Second, and of greater relevance here, the property story told in 
the last Section contains the seeds of its own critique with respect to 
trademark. The account contemplates situations in which courts may 
opt for a more nuanced regulatory regime over a strong private right to 
exclude. To the extent trademark law reflects these conditions, judicial 
alternation between thick and thin trademark protection is un-
surprising.168 
 
164. As reflected by a long line of precedents that rejects easy property analogies. 
See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 414 (1916) (“[T]he 
trade-mark is treated as merely a protection for the good-will, and not the 
subject of property except in connection with an existing business.”). 
165. Michael Grynberg, Trademark Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 60, 112–13 (2008). 
166. And the need for monitoring to maintain quality control (so as to prevent 
any claim of prohibited naked licensing) would add to transactions costs of 
such arrangements, making them less likely. See, e.g., Barcamerica Int’l 
USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps. Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 595–96 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“[W]here the licensor fails to exercise adequate quality control over the 
licensee, a court may find that the trademark owner has abandoned the 
trademark, in which case the owner would be estopped from asserting rights 
to the trademark.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). 
167. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 69, at 408 (“Exclusivity in the trademark is 
only needed to point consumers in the right direction, and that function is 
preserved by protecting the mark’s signaling function.”). 
168. The above discussion can also be cast as a problem of how best to minimize 
the administration costs of the trademark system. Treating marks as thick 
enables judges to economize on decision making by avoiding factual 
complexity, which may lead courts to overlook reasons that a challenged use 
may not in fact be detrimental to consumer understanding. Stated in terms 
of the modularity discussion above, thick protection hides information (e.g., 
market context, consumer understanding and sophistication) behind an easy-
to-apply formulation that unauthorized uses of a mark are presumptively 
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1. Third Party Interests and Vacillating Precedent 
In the property-as-information-management story, minimizing in-
formation costs is a progressively weaker justification for strong pro-
perty rules as the rights and interests of others come into play.169 
Trademark’s subject matter is the exchange of information, which by 
its nature implicates the interests of sellers and consumers. Indeed, First 
Amendment doctrine has long ascribed reciprocal interests between 
speaker and listener, even in the commercial context.170 Trademark law, 
therefore, lends itself to contextual balancing that takes the rights and 
interests of others into account.171 
First, language is often conceived of as a commons,172 reflecting a 
baseline that trademark law has always had to work around. A lot of 
its doctrine therefore ensures that trademark rights do not remove 
useful words from circulation.173 But even valid trademarks become part 
 
likely to confuse. This was the case in Maker’s Mark, in which the focus on 
the wax seal led the court to minimize exculpatory facts that could have 
prevented confusion among consumers. See supra notes 123–135 and 
accompanying text. Cf. Bone, supra note 142, at 2152 (“[F]ocusing on 
confusion and downplaying or ignoring harm might still be the best approach 
in light of enforcement cost concerns.”). 
169. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
170. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (“The 
listener’s interest [in commercial speech] is substantial: the consumer’s 
concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than 
his concern for urgent political dialogue . . . . [S]uch speech serves individual 
and societal interests in assuring informed and reliable decisionmaking.” 
(citations omitted)); cf. also, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 708 (2000) 
(noting balance of interest between speaker and unwilling listeners); Red Lion 
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“[T]he people as a whole retain 
their interest in free speech by radio [and other forms of broadcast] and their 
collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and 
purposes of the First Amendment,” and “[i]t is the right of the viewers and 
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”). 
171. To use Smith’s language, the need to mediate competing interests requires 
courts to rely on a governance, rather than a property, model for the 
management of entitlements because “many problematic interactions are not 
solvable using boundaries and are important enough to call for enriching the 
interface between property modules.” Smith, supra note 145, at 1714. 
172. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the 
Commons in a Connected World 21 (2013) (“Language is a commons, 
though its resource is nonrivalrous (my use of it does not inhibit yours).”). 
173. Descriptive marks, for example, may be protected only upon a showing of 
secondary meaning, and even when protected are subject to the defense that 
the junior user is only employing the term in its descriptive, non-trademark 
sense. That is, one may obtain the trademark DELICIOUS for donuts, but a 
competitor may still claim to sell donuts that are delicious. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. 
§ 1052(e)(1) (2012), (f) (descriptive marks may only be registered with 
secondary meaning); id. § 1115(b)(4) (defense). Generic terms are not 
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of everyday vocabulary, creating an interest for those who might want 
to use their embodied meanings to communicate.174 This is the problem 
of extended trademark meaning described in the previous Part. 
Second, trademark law’s official object of concern is consumer wel-
fare,175 giving consumers, and more broadly citizens, an interest in the 
scope of trademark rights. Trademark law acknowledges this, though 
incompletely, as it does a better job of vigilantly policing the danger of 
consumer confusion than it does with appreciating the prospect that 
consumers often have something to gain from purportedly confusing 
conduct.176 
To be sure, courts understand that trademark cases implicate a 
range of interests,177 and that trademarks are not simple pieces of 
property.178 The question then is whether any particular interest re-
quires formal protection from trademark doctrine (versus simply relying 
on judges to act as safety valves if trademark holders go too far with 
their claims). The more one thinks so, the more the hand waving of 
cases like Louboutin becomes unsatisfying. Simple property rules 
leavened by the occasional judicial intervention will not do. But moving 
too far in the opposite direction increases information costs. 
Judicial vacillation between thin and thick marks may therefore be 
an inevitable symptom and a source of doctrinal instability in modern 
trademark law. Judges consistently blink before following property 
rationales for trademark to their logical ends, but they likewise demur 
from drawing clear lines to constrain doctrine.179 The urge to thicken 
marks immediately produces pressure to weaken them, for they cannot 
be contained by trademark doctrine, but trademark doctrine has not 
evolved clear language to explain permitted uses either.180 
 
protected . See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2012) (providing for cancellation of 
registrations if mark becomes generic); id. § 1127 (providing that a mark is 
deemed abandoned if it becomes generic). 
174. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 960, 
975 (1993) (“[A]ny doctrine that gives people property rights in words, 
symbols, and images that have worked their way into our popular culture 
must carefully consider the communicative functions those marks serve.”). 
175. Though courts speak of consumer and seller interests, the statutory metric 
of enforcement is likelihood of confusion measured at the consumer level. 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2012). 
176. I make this argument at length in Grynberg, supra note 165. 
177. See supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text. 
178. 4 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 24:11 (collecting recitations of the “oft-
repeated statement that a trademark is not a ‘right in gross’”). 
179. See supra notes 112–121 and accompanying text. 
180. Grynberg, supra note 76, at 914–25. 
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The result is a push/pull reflected in the scope of protection ac-
corded by judges to a mark. Courts protect trademark information be-
yond source and sponsorship, and then either follow that logic to 
questionable ends181 or engage in contortions to resist them.182 They 
neither want to surrender the capacity of a modularized trademark to 
simplify cases, nor can they fully embrace it. The result is inconsistent 
precedents. Opinions giving thick protection are followed by rulings 
that give thinner rights but refrain from attacking the logic of the 
broader rulings.183 
Trademark law’s encounter with the internet is an example.184 In 
particular, the history of using trademarks as a search tool—from 
metatags to keyword advertising—illustrates the tension between thick 
and thin trademark stories. 
Google and its clients continue to face litigation over the practice 
of keyword advertising, though the practice appears to be on increas-
ingly solid legal ground.185 The claim that it is infringement to use a 
search of a trademarked term to trigger third-party advertising owes 
 
181. For example, Ga. Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Von Drehle Corp. allowed a 
trademark claim to proceed against a provider of paper toweling compatible 
with Georgia Pacific machines. 618 F.3d 441 (4th Cir. 2010). Georgia Pacific’s 
theory was that the defendant’s toweling in its branded machines could cause 
it reputational harm. Id. at 445–46. Against that is the problem that a 
successful claim would allow the plaintiff to prevent competition with its 
product and allow it to raise prices accordingly. Id. at 448. From a doctrinal 
perspective, its problem was that prospective purchasers, distributors of paper 
toweling, knew not to assume that a Georgia Pacific machine would 
automatically contain toweling from the company. Id. The Fourth Circuit 
nonetheless held that it would be error to so limit the relevant consumer class, 
hypothesizing that there still could be harm to the company’s reputation. Id. 
at 453–55. Georgia Pacific prevailed, winning a jury award of $791,431 in 
damages. Ga. Pac. Consumer Products, LP v. Von Drehle Corp., 710 F.3d 
527, 532 (4th Cir. 2013). Georgia Pacific fared less well with similar claims 
elsewhere, but still managed to get to a verdict. See Ga. Pac. Consumer Prods. 
LP v. Myers Supply, Inc., 621 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming lower 
court’s grant of summary judgment against Georgia-Pacific’s claim for tortious 
interference with a contractual relationship). 
182. As the Ninth Circuit had to in a keyword advertising case to fight the import 
of the circuit’s earlier, broad rulings. See infra notes 196–197 and 
accompanying text. 
183. Id. 
184. Eric Goldman, Brand Spillovers, 22 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 381 (2009). 
185. Eric Goldman, More Confirmation That Google Has Won the AdWords 
Trademark Battles Worldwide, Forbes, (March 22, 2013). http://www. 
forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/03/22/more-confirmation-that-google-
has-won-the-adwords-trademark-battles-worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/N7BR 
-AQRT].  
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much of its plausibility to the notorious Brookfield case.186 There, the 
defendant used the plaintiff’s trademark in code, metatags, on its 
webpage. These metatags were invisible to human viewers. They were 
used in the hope that search engines would read them and then return 
the page as a search result for the term.187 
Despite the obvious differences between the parties’ webpages, the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that the use of a trademark as a metatag was in-
herently likely to create initial interest confusion for consumers.188 While 
the consumer confusion story used by the court was somewhat 
implausible, the case rested on protecting the trademark’s extended 
meaning, specifically its goodwill.189 That approach allowed the court 
to simplify questions about the actual effect of the use on consumers—
and whether that effect would have spillover consequences on the 
strength of the mark or its ability to embody goodwill.190 It also required 
the court to overlook the prospect that the use might actually broaden 
the availability of relevant information to consumers.191 
 
186. Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
187. Id. at 1062. In practice, search engines tend to ignore metatags. Matt Cutts, 
Google Does Not Use the Keywords Meta Tag in Web Ranking, Google 
Webmaster Central Blog (Sept. 21, 2009), http:// 
googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.com/2009/09/google-does-not-use-
keywords-meta-tag.html [https://perma.cc/L73Q-XJHD]. 
188. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062. Initial interest, or presale, confusion refers to 
confusion that is dispelled prior to the purchase decision. Brookfield indicated 
that mere diversion (absent confusion) would suffice. The Ninth Circuit later 
walked back that aspect of Brookfield. Network Automation, Inc. v. 
Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[B]ecause 
the sine qua non of trademark infringement is consumer confusion, when we 
examine initial interest confusion, the owner of the mark must demonstrate 
likely confusion, not mere diversion.”). 
189. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062 (“[B]y using ‘moviebuff.com’ or ‘MovieBuff’ to 
divert people looking for ‘MovieBuff’ to its web site, West Coast improperly 
benefits from the goodwill that Brookfield developed in its mark.”). 
190. If any such effect may be found. For research on the effect of the use of 
trademarks as keywords, see Stefan Bechtold & Catherine Tucker, 
Trademarks, Triggers and Online Search, 11 J. of Emp. Leg. Studies 718 
(2014); David J. Franklyn & David A. Hyman, Trademarks as Search Engine 
Keywords: Who, What, When?, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 2117 (2014); David J. 
Franklyn & David A. Hyman, Trademarks as Search Engine Keywords: Much 
Ado About Something?, 26 Harv. J. of L. & Tech. 481 (2013); Lesley Chiou 
& Catherine Tucker, How Does the Use of Trademarks by Third-Party Sellers 
Affect Online Search?, (Dec. 9, 2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1686438. 
191. I discuss this point at greater length in Grynberg, supra note 67, at 121–28. 
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Brookfield was a powerful weapon for trademark holders. Slowly 
but surely, however, the precedent’s power eroded. Other courts de-
clined to adopt it wholesale.192 While it lived on in the Ninth Circuit,193 
successive panels began to inject limits.194 In the meantime, cases over 
the irrelevant practice of metatags gave way to the more important 
battles over keyword advertising. Here, Google and others have 
vigorously defended the practice. Having a well-capitalized lead 
defendant, while perhaps drawing plaintiffs looking for deep pockets, 
has had an effect, as Google seems to have beaten back most challenges 
to its adwords program.195 
Most notably, the Ninth Circuit rolled back Brookfield as applied 
to trademark-triggered advertising, holding that such advertising does 
not create liability unless the displayed advertisement itself creates 
likely confusion.196 Merely using a mark to trigger the display of 
advertising is not enough. The shift recognizes that consumers have an 
interest in seeing non-confusing ad copy that broadens their access to 
information, even at the expense of a court’s having to make a more 
nuanced contextual judgment about the effect of the trademark’s use. 
In Smith’s terminology, the court has moved from an exclusion to a 
governance model.197 
We might prize the Ninth Circuit’s shift as the genius of the com-
mon law at work, but it is worth noting that the state of precedential 
play is less favorable to defendants who lack Google’s resources. The 
courts have largely rejected rules that would categorically treat key-
word advertising as legal or at the least offer shortcuts for defendants 
 
192. See, e.g., Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 
539, 550–51 (6th Cir. 2005). 
193. Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (2004) 
(allowing initial interest confusion theory claim against keyed website banner 
advertising to proceed). But see id. at 1034–36 (Berzon, J., concurring) 
(suggesting that underlying Brookfield opinion should be reconsidered). 
194. Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 803–04 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(applying nominative fair use doctrine to metatag use). 
195. See supra note 185 (reporting that keyword advertising appears to be on 
increasingly solid legal ground). 
196. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 
1154 (9th Cir. 2011). Specifically, the court held that in keyword cases “the 
most relevant factors to the analysis of the likelihood of confusion are: (1) the 
strength of the mark; (2) the evidence of actual confusion; (3) the type of 
goods and degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; and (4) the 
labeling and appearance of the advertisements and the surrounding context 
on the screen displaying the results page.” See also Multi Time Mach., Inc. 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 804 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
1231 (2016). 
197. See supra notes 152–153 and accompanying text. 
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who are not engaging in deliberate efforts at consumer deception.198 
Moreover, while much of Brookfield’s bite has dulled, many of its doc-
trinal foundations remain intact.199 It may yet resurface to challenge the 
next information innovation that makes unauthorized use of trademark 
information. 
2. Very Thin Marks 
Depending on the information being protected, and the nature of 
third party interests, the scope of equivalence required for infringement 
often extends beyond the mark. In such cases, 100 percent copying of 
the mark is not enough for liability, further underscoring the inability 
of courts to pursue maximally thick protection.200 
The Ninth Circuit’s nominative fair use test is an example. 
Nominative fair use protects uses of a mark that refer to the trademark 
holder or its products. Although the doctrine considers the degree to 
which the plaintiff’s mark has been copied, total copying does not 
negate the defendant’s ability to assert the defense.201 This is sensible, 
for the point of a nominative use is to refer to the trademark holder’s 
product. It would be odd to require that the reference be oblique. It 
therefore stands to reason, as the case law recognizes, that total copying 
of the mark should not weigh heavily against a defendant if the larger  
198. See, e.g., Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(declining to expand functionality doctrine to protect use of trademarks in 
keyword advertising); Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (declining to apply a strong trademark use requirement to 
trademark claims against keyword advertising). 
199. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 
2013) (finding evidence insufficient to sustain initial interest confusion claim 
without rejecting the theory). 
200. In this, thin trademark protection goes beyond the meaning of thin 
protection commonly used in copyright law. In copyright cases, the 
assumption is that protection may be limited in that the copyright has a 
narrow range of equivalents, but once the requisite level of similarity is 
reached, thin protection is full protection (barring an argument of fair use). 
Supra note 90. In the terminology of this Article, the protection is internally 
thin, but externally thick. And to the extent fair use is an issue that limits 
the external thickness of the copyright, it is worth noting that the Supreme 
Court takes the view that this analysis is external to the infringement 
inquiry, as it deems fair use to be a defense and not part of the prima facie 
infringement case. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 
(1994). 
201. “First, the product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable 
without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or marks 
may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; 
and third, the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the 
mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.” New 
Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 
1992) (citation omitted). 
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context shows no intent to deceive consumers.202 The real work is in the 
requirement that “the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction 
with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark 
holder.”203 
The reason that trademarks get such thin protection in a nomin-
ative use case is in part because they are often not about source infor-
mation, but rather disputes about protecting a mark’s extended mean-
ing. Resolving them requires consideration of the larger context in 
which the mark is used. This is part of the formal doctrine for some 
courts’ tests for nominative and expressive use.204 These tests are 
context-heavy, and reflect the inability of trademark ownership to fully 
act as an information-masking modular device. The more the range of 
mark information under consideration broadens, the more courts need 
to take context into account in adjudicating the boundaries of the 
markholder’s “property.” 
If we cannot resolve trademark infringement cases without con-
sidering information outside the mark and its use, are we still engaging 
in trademark litigation? I have argued elsewhere that in many cases the 
better answer is no. Some cases about a trademark’s extended meaning 
should be reconceived as false advertising cases.205 But if we insist on 
using trademark law to dispose of them, then the implication is that 
trademarks cannot be conceived of as a property right in meaningful 
way. There is simply no way to apply a right to exclude in the manner 
set forth in the information cost account of property without sweeping 
too broadly. The only question is whether we recognize this reality at 
 
202. For example, total copying could become relevant if, say, someone copied a 
logo and used hard-to-see or minimal distinguishing text, so that the use 
would be nominative in name but a trademark use in fact. The “Dumb 
Starbucks,” campaign could have been an example had it not been a prank 
from the television show Nathan for You or shut down by the health 
department before trademark law could do the job. See Andy Greene, 
Nathan Fielder Talks ‘Dumb Starbucks’ and Pranking Instagram, Rolling 
Stone (July 24, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/movies/news/nathan-
fielder-talks-dumb-starbucks-and-pranking-instagram-20140724 [https:// 
perma.cc/SUN8-WNH].  
203. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308. 
204. See supra note 105. 
205. Michael Grynberg, More Than IP: Trademark Among the Consumer 
Information Laws, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1429, 1484 (2014). In other 
words, third parties have a right to talk about the markholder so long as 
they do not engage in actionable falsehoods. In most cases, that means not 
running afoul of false advertising law, the doctrines of which are calibrated 
to assess the larger context in which the statements appear. 
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the beginning or at the tail end of a procession of precedents that have 
somehow gone too far.206 
3. The Limited Utility of Property Stories 
Trademark law needs little help to justify protecting the source-
identifying function of trademarks. The consumer interest in accurate 
information does well enough. But this is the arena where the property 
stories for trademark work best. Stated another way, property stories 
about trademark make the most sense where they do the least work. 
For example, a typical rationale for intellectual property rights 
focuses on incentives for investment and creation.207 Because IP is non-
rivalrous and non-excludable, the argument goes, creators will not make 
the initial investment in creation without the ability to recoup their 
costs by having exclusive rights over their work once it is created. 
Whatever the strength of this rationale—it is the theory behind patent 
and copyright law208—its relevance to trademark is less obvious.209 And 
trademark law treats the need to identify and distinguish oneself in the 
marketplace as incentive enough for sellers to adopt marks.210 
Another common economic rationale for property rights, the need 
to manage resources to maximize yield and/or prevent congestion and 
overconsumption,211 is generally seen as a poor fit for copyright and 
patent law due to impossibility of exhaustion.212 Centuries in the public 
 
206. It is also worth noting that very thin marks also hold open the potential for 
easily resolving cases in the defendant’s favor. Returning to the nominative 
fair use example, if courts rigorously require plaintiffs to establish affirmative 
acts that suggest sponsorship beyond mere use of the mark, many such cases 
could be resolved on summary judgment. 
207. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic 
Structure of Intellectual Property Law 13 (2003) (“The dynamic 
benefit of a property right is the incentive that possession of such a right 
imparts in the creation or improvement of a resource . . . given that no else 
can appropriate the resource . . . .”). 
208. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
209. But see David W. Barnes, A New Economics of Trademarks, 5 Nw. J. Tech. 
& Intell. Prop. 22, 24 (2006) (disagreeing “with the common assumptions 
that trademarks, unlike expressions and innovations, are private rather than 
public goods, that there is no market failure in the private provision of source-
indicating devices, and that trademark law is fundamentally different from 
copyright and patent law”). 
210. Dreyfuss, supra note 69, at 408. 
211. Landes & Posner, supra note 207, at 13. 
212. At least back to the founding era, “[n]o one possesses the less [of an idea], 
because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from 
me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his 
taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.” Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 The Writings of 
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domain have not created a tragedy of the commons for Shakespeare. 
But this rationale for property rights at least rhymes with some of the 
justifications for trademark protection. COCA-COLA would mean little 
if anyone could use it to signal source for a soda.213 
Stated another way, trademark law, in contrast to copyright and 
patent law, protects subject matter that is congestible to some extent.214 
But this rationale loses force the further we move from source 
identification. Here, the classic critiques of intellectual property take 
effect, including the problem that transaction costs prevent bargaining 
to permit welfare-enhancing activity by third parties.215  
These problems take us to the paradox discussed above. A trade-
mark’s source-identifying function enables the mark to convey ad-
ditional information. The more protection that a mark owner receives 
for this building block, the more constrained these meanings are, po-
tentially impoverishing the information environment. But this tells us 
little about how to manage the meanings built out of a mark’s source-
identifying function. Consider dilution doctrine. It is based on the belief 
that third-party uses of a trademarked term on non-competing products 
threaten the trademark’s ability to function as an identifier even absent 
a likelihood of confusion. This account is disputed,216 but the ability to 
 
Thomas Jefferson 175, 180 (H.A. Washington ed., 1857). This is, of course, 
a “casual” invocation of Jefferson, but the principle is straightforward even if 
the skepticism of intellectual property ascribed to Jefferson may have been 
more nuanced. Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of 
Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 993, 998 
(2006). 
213. And some take this argument further to argue that even non-competing uses 
have rivalrous characteristics, justifying the dilution doctrine. Barnes, supra 
note 209, at 25. 
214. Transaction costs concerning this information, moreover, would seem to be 
low, consistent with traditional claims for the benefits of property. The owner 
of the trademark entitlement is generally easy to find, and the scope of basic 
trademark rights are relatively clear. In many cases transactions over use of 
the mark as a source identifier will be part of a larger transaction, like the 
transfer of a product line and the valuation and assignment of its goodwill. 
215. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 207, at 16 (noting the transaction 
cost problem in the IP context). Traditionally, trademark law has given little 
attention to a range of activities that reflect a mark’s positive externalities. 
Goldman, supra note 184, at 390–97. The new markets and practices offered 
by the internet have encouraged trademark holders to explore prior paths 
not taken. Id. at 400. 
216. Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive 
Science, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 507, 546 (2008) (“Given the available evidence, 
the cognitive model of dilution lacks enough empirical support to justify its 
adoption as a general theory underlying dilution law. There is still too much 
we do not know about how consumers process marks in the marketplace. At 
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glide over difficult factual questions like these is the very appeal of 
property stories.217 
Alternatively, we might have faith that a mark’s core meaning will 
survive unauthorized invocations of a mark’s extended meaning. Even 
if such uses create harm, other laws may pick up the slack. False 
advertising law, for example, addresses situations in which a competitor 
uses the stable source signal of a mark to say something about the 
markholder. To some extent, trademark law recognizes this by 
channeling many nominative claims into false advertising law.218 
Likewise, external factors may protect trademark meaning from the 
effect of unauthorized uses. For example, trademark cases used to be 
more concerned with the prospect that the use of another’s trademark 
in a domain name might undermine the strength of the mark or cause 
consumer confusion. Two developments removed much of the pressure 
for a response from traditional trademark law. First, new regulations, 
both public and quasi-public, emerged as an alternative avenue for 
trademark owners to press their case.219 Second, the rise of search 
engines undermined the fear that consumers had no option other than 
guessing at domain names in order to find the sites belonging to 
trademark holders.220 These developments have perhaps made it easier 
for courts to see that many third-party uses of trademarks in domain 
names could themselves broaden the availability of information to 
consumers.221 
The property skeptic might also focus on the need for stable source 
meaning as a building block for other uses. It generates the externality 
of other meanings. To the extent that these spillovers may be harmful, 
other regimes and devices are a better fit for dealing with the fallout 
than trademark law. I have argued elsewhere that compartmentalizing 
 
a minimum, we cannot predict that any particular dilutive use will produce 
the difficulties posited by the cognitive model.”). 
217. See supra Part II.A. 
218. Grynberg, supra note 205, at 1479. I have argued elsewhere that trademark 
law could be yet more aggressive on this front. Id. at 1470–93. 
219. See infra notes 231–246 and accompanying text. 
220. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 
2010) (“When people go shopping online, they don’t start out by typing 
random URLs containing trademarked words hoping to get a lucky hit. They 
may start out by typing trademark.com, but then they’ll rely on a search 
engine or word of mouth.”). 
221. Id. at 1180 (concluding that domain names “buyorleaselexus.com and buy-
a-lexus.com” when used by autobrokers was potential nominative fair use 
under Ninth Circuit doctrine because “it’s enough to satisfy our test for 
necessity that [defendants] needed to communicate that they specialize in 
Lexus vehicles, and using the Lexus mark in their domain names 
accomplished this goal”). 
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questions in this way—which effectively treats trademark law as a 
modular part of consumer information law—benefits both trademark 
law and the larger consumer information “ecosystem.”222 Limiting 
trademark law’s concern, to the extent possible, to questions of source 
meaning, ensures that existing trademark doctrine is oriented in a 
coherent direction. When trademark law is asked to do more, its tools 
may become misaligned, creating uncertainty when doctrines like the 
multifactor test are contorted to apply to situations that are unlike the 
source confusion setting for which they were designed.223 
This is an alternative way to apply modularity to trademark law—
in this case by minimizing the interactions between trademark doctrine 
and the rest of consumer information law by narrowing its focus. Others 
may find the simpler modularization is to let trademark owners resolve 
matters by giving them thick protection. Both approaches simplify 
matters, which suggests again that judicial shifting between the two is 
unsurprising. Even the property-skeptical account, however, recognizes 
the importance of strong protections with respect to core source 
meanings. 
III. One Approach to Calibration 
The purpose of this Article has been to consider what calibrations 
of thickness of trademark protection tell us about the operation of 
trademark law. The above discussion posits that the overlapping 
meanings embodied by trademarks present an information management 
problem. Its complexity creates the urge to accord marks thick, 
property-like protection, but this urge is impossible to pursue fully in 
practice. The resulting tension produces instability in trademark doct-
rine. These claims are descriptive. They do not depend on any par-
ticular policy view about the proper scope of trademark law. 
This Part shifts to the normative and argues that courts should 
adjust trademark thickness based on the kind of information that the 
trademark holder seeks to protect. Thick protection makes more sense 
the closer one is to trademark’s source-identifying core, but less so the 
further one moves away from it. At the very least, threats to peripheral 
meanings should not be easier to prove than those directed at the core. 
But if certain meanings must be added to the trademark holder’s 
dominion, the expansion should be isolated from the rest of trademark 
law. This can be done by carving narrow doctrinal pockets in which 
protection is thick but restricted to a narrow context. 
A. Managing Externalities 
A trademark’s ability to embody extended meanings depends on its 
threshold capacity to identify source. Clearing that threshold entitles  
222. Grynberg, supra note 205, at 1470–93. 
223. Id. at 1486–88. 
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the mark to the legal protection that preserves that function. It follows 
that trademark protection should be thickest when a mark’s source-
identifying function is at issue. Providing a stable base of meaning 
enables others to use, attach, and develop extended meanings connected 
to the mark. These add-on meanings become more difficult to create if 
the base is unstable. Commentary about APPLE computers is 
meaningful because APPLE has a stable source meaning. Likewise, a 
CHEWY VUITON dog toy loses its humor if the target audience lacks 
a reliable association with LOUIS VUITTON.224  
In the latter case, the trademark holder tried, and failed, to assert 
control over the parodic use. Louis Vuitton used dilution law to claim 
that the alternative use actually posed a threat to source identification. 
Rejecting that argument assumes that thickness of protection at the 
mark’s source identifying core provides enough incentive for 
markholders to create a stable platform of meaning from which other 
meanings flow.225 
If a mark’s source meaning is secure, the case for protecting non-
source meanings from third-party use will often be suspect. Many of 
these uses rest on the source-identification function of the mark. They 
are, in essence, externalities of the mark’s creation, some positive, some 
negative. Shifting the thickness of a mark’s protection is one vehicle for 
courts to control how much of the mark’s information the holder is able 
to control and how much others are free to use. Maker’s Mark and 
Louboutin reflect two differing approaches. The Louboutin court left 
more room for positive externalities to develop. The thick core/thin 
periphery perspective suggests that Maker’s Mark, by contrast, struck 
the wrong balance. 
But to the extent a use of a mark’s extended meaning is harmful 
and worth enjoining, trademark doctrine should be circumspect about 
the method used to halt it, lest other, positive externalities be inhibited. 
Interventions of this sort should be limited to the contexts that generate 
them. As discussed below, granting thick protection in constrained 
settings may be a means to this end. 
 
224. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 267 
(4th Cir. 2007) (holding that a dog toy named “Chewy Vuiton” was unlikely 
to dilute the LOUIS VUITTON mark and noting that “by making the famous 
mark an object of the parody, a successful parody might actually enhance the 
famous mark’s distinctiveness by making it an icon. The brunt of the joke 
becomes yet more famous.”). 
225. But cf. Barnes, supra note 209, at 25 (arguing that “[b]ecause trademarks 
have the non-rivalrous characteristic of public goods in some uses and at 
least partially rivalrous characteristics in other uses, an unregulated private 
market is unlikely to provide optimal incentives to produce trademarks”). 
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B. Back to the Future 
Trademark law past and present provides several examples of thick 
protection for source meaning, but thin protection for meanings built 
from the root of source identification. This approach simplifies litigation 
while protecting beneficial trademark externalities.  
1. Past 
Courts once doubted that trademark rights should extend beyond 
source confusion in a mark’s home market.226 But within trademark’s 
old core, marks were perhaps thicker than they are today. All that was 
necessary for infringement was sharing a market plus mark similarity. 
The law assumed the rest.227 
Once trademark rights expanded into non-competing markets to 
create liability for confusion beyond matters of source, trademark law 
developed a more complex analysis. Rather than simply consider simi-
larity, infringement claims for goods in differing markets required the 
analysis of what became the modern multifactor likelihood of confusion 
test. These tests considered other contextual factors, among them the 
likelihood that the products or services would enter the same market 
(bridge the gap). In time, however, the multifactor test came to apply 
to all infringement cases, even those in which there was no gap to 
bridge.228 
 
226. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text. 
227. Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: 
Toward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 Nw. L. 
Rev. 1307, 1322 (observing that in the late 1800s “[a]nyone who used an 
identical or nearly identical mark on directly competing goods infringed the 
owner’s property right and was liable without regard to likely confusion”). 
But the property-like protection was mitigated by its narrowness insofar as 
goods needed to be competing. The parallel law of unfair competition, 
moreover, imposed greater burdens on protection, requiring that trade names 
develop secondary meaning and that there be a likelihood of confusion before 
a court would provide any remedy. Id. Even as the distinction between 
trademark and unfair competition law began to erode and likelihood of 
confusion became the focus of both regimes, “the old terminology remained, 
and so too did the assumption that ‘trade-marks’ (i.e., fanciful, arbitrary, 
and suggestive word marks) had a stronger claim to protection than ‘trade 
names’ (i.e., descriptive, geographic, and personal name marks).” Id. at 1323. 
Likewise, the Restatement used two different multifactor tests, “one [with 
four factors] for ‘confusing similarity’ when products compete and the other 
[with nine] for ‘confusing association’ when products do not compete.” Id. at 
1318 (discussing the Restatement of Torts as published in 1938). 
228. 4 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 24:57 (“By 1988, the Polaroid factors, 
developed to analyze cases of alleged infringement by noncompetitive goods, 
was adopted for use in cases of competing goods as well.”). To be sure, 
Professor McCarthy notes the existence of some cases in which courts glide 
over the application when the marks are identical and in the same market. 
Id. at § 24:32 (“But some courts in the Second Circuit will by-pass the 
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Uniting all infringement analyses under the multifactor umbrella 
was arguably perverse for reasons discussed in part above. Consider-
ations of context are perhaps the least necessary in a source confusion 
case where the products compete; mark similarity ought to do the job. 
But the test evolved to encompass other considerations, including issues 
applicable to sponsorship confusion.229 A test designed to consider the 
harms of passing off and sponsorship confusion is ill-suited for 
considering claims away from trademark’s traditional core. Thus, we 
have the strange results where courts sometimes give thicker protection 
to a mark in a context in which harm seems less likely.230 The old 
approach of relatively thick protection in source confusion cases might 
have allowed for a more tailored analysis elsewhere. 
2. Present 
Calibrating thickness of protection to protect trademark 
externalities may also explain more recent evolutions of trademark 
doctrine. 
a. Domain Names 
The rise of the internet as a marketing channel in the 1990s created 
the issue of how to manage trademarks as part of a domain name. The 
issue included both garden-variety infringement suits in which marks 
appeared in domain names231 as well as so-called “cybersquatting,” the 
name given to the practice of registering a domain name in hopes of 
extracting compensation from a trademark holder.232 These questions 
seemed urgent in part because the rush to register valuable names often 
 
Polaroid eight-factor test to find infringement when the marks are identical 
and the goods are directly competitive.”). This is not to say that the doctrinal 
difference necessarily works a great change in practice. A study of judicial 
application of the multifactor tests reveals that mark similarity is the factor 
that is most likely to be outcome determinative. Beebe, supra note 18, at 
1600. 
229. Bone, supra note 227, at 1317–19 (describing the early Restatement 
approach, which “used two distinct multifactor tests, one for ‘confusing 
similarity’ when products compete and the other for ‘confusing association’ 
when products do not compete”); id. at 1332 (noting that Judge Friendly’s 
Polaroid opinion relied in part on both Restatement approaches) (discussing 
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)). 
230. See supra notes 123–134 and accompanying text. 
231. See, e.g., Brookfield Commc’n, Inc. v. West Coat Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 
1036, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999).  
232. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 
949, 959 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (defining cybersquatter as “an entrepreneur who 
made a business of registering trademarks as domain names for the purpose 
of selling them later to the trademarks’ owners”). 
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left someone other than the trademark holder with the domain name 
that used the term. 
This created instability in trademark law, in part because courts 
had a strong intuition that trademark holders ought to control domain 
names built out of the marks.233 Their opinions often did the job of 
shifting control over the domain names from the registrant to the 
trademark holder, but at the expense of stretching preexisting notions 
of trademark infringement and dilution. The resulting precedents 
reached beyond cybersquatting to also threaten expressive activities 
(e.g. “sucks” sites) and the use of trademarks in domain names to pro-
mote complementary or ancillary services.234 They also sometimes ig-
nored context critical to normal trademark litigation in their haste to 
reassign the domain name,235 which is to say courts wanted to give 
trademarks thick protection with respect to domain names.236 
Two intervening developments relieved some of the pressure on 
trademark doctrine by allowing thick protection in a narrower class of 
domain name cases. Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer 
Protection Act (ACPA),237 and the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN)238 adopted the Uniform Dispute 
 
233. Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp. 1337, 1338 (C.D. Cal. 1998) 
(“Like all ‘cybersquatters,’ defendants usurp all of the accepted meanings of 
their domain names, so as to prevent others from using the same domain 
names in any of their accepted meanings.”), rev’d 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
234. See generally Hannibal Travis, The Battle for Mindshare: The Emerging 
Consensus that the First Amendment Protects Corporate Criticism and 
Parody on the Internet, 10 Va. J.L. & Tech. 3, 17–29 (2005) (describing 
the development of trademark liability for corporate criticism or parody 
websites). 
235. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp., 189 F.3d at 877 (reversing summary 
judgment on behalf of trademark owners for, among other things, failing 
to establish that plaintiff marks were famous under dilution statute). 
236. In litigation involving domain names, the Ninth Circuit once took the view 
that in cases involving trademarks on the internet, a “troika” of factors—(1) 
mark similarity (2) product relatedness, and (3) “the simultaneous use of the 
Web as a marketing channel”—were particularly relevant. GoTo.com, Inc. v. 
Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2000). The court has since 
realized the overbreadth of this view with respect to internet cases, but has 
indicated that the “troika” remains relevant to domain-name cases. Network 
Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1148 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
237. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 
113 Stat. 1501A-545. ACPA is housed in the Lanham Act provisions of the 
U.S. Code, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012). 
238. ICANN’s functions include coordinating the internet’s domain name system. 
See generally, e.g., Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Nos., About 
ICANN, ICANN.org, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/welcome-
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Resolution Policy (UDRP).239 Both regimes enable trademark owners 
to compel the transfer of trademark-based domain names—one through 
a cause of action, the other through an arbitration proceeding. 
ACPA and the UDRP have similar standards. In essence, both re-
duce the inquiry to three questions: (1) Is the domain name “confusingly 
similar” to the mark?240 (2) Does the registrant have rights to the 
trademarked term?241 and (3) Is the registration in good faith?242 
Though some of these questions open the door to factual parsing,243 the 
net effect is to thicken trademark protection in the domain name 
context by removing the question of likely consumer confusion—and all 
the contextual development that comes with it—from the analysis. 
I have argued elsewhere that the creation of these trademark-
protections, which supplement the traditional trademark causes of 
action, gave breathing space within trademark law for the use of 
trademarks in domain names (as well as removing an incentive to 
stretch trademark law to reach purported cybersquatting).244 Once 
TRADEMARK.com was deemed to belong to the trademark holder, it 
 
2012-02-25-en [https://perma.cc/9KL8-ZXB6] (describing ICANN’s role in 
coordinating internet domain names). 
239. Internet Corp. for Assigned Names and Nos., Uniform Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN.org, http://www.icann.org/en/help/ 
dndr/udrp/policy [https://perma.cc/8VNN-99RM]. 
240. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (2012); Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy, supra note 239, at 4(a)(i). 
241. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I) (2012); Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy, supra note 239, at 4(a)(ii). 
242. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2012); Uniform Domain Name Dispute 
Resolution Policy, supra note 239, at 4(a)(iii). 
243. ACPA lists a range of factors to be considered in assessing bad faith, 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(d)(B)(i) (2012). Some of them, however, may be balanced 
with little factual development. See, e.g., id. (listing as factors whether the 
domain name registrant has trademark rights in the term, are known by it, 
or have previously offered goods under it, as well as the provision of false 
contact information in registering the name or the offer to sell or transfer the 
name). Likewise the bad-faith inquiry of the UDRP could be highly 
contextual, but in practice often is not. See Amy Bender, UDRP Opinion 
Guide, Berkman Center for Internet & Society (2002), 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/udrp/opinion/btext.html [https://perma.cc/ 
H4DU-DYWD] (collecting examples of UDRP rulings on bad-faith issue). 
244. See Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.net, 302 F.3d 248, 261 (4th Cir. 
2002) (“We may and do conclude that the enactment of the ACPA 
eliminated any need to force trademark-dilution law beyond its traditional 
bounds in order to fill a past hole, now otherwise plugged, in protection of 
trademark rights.”); Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 
F.3d 489, 497 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e think it is clear that the new law was 
adopted specifically to provide courts with a preferable alternative to 
stretching federal dilution law when dealing with cybersquatting cases.”). 
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became easier for courts to countenance expressive uses like 
TRADEMARKisaterribleproduct.com or complementary ones like 
wesellTRADEMARK.com.245 Because of the thick protection accorded 
in response to the narrow question (who gets TRADEMARK.com?), 
courts could give the mark thinner protection in other contexts where 
source confusion would be less likely. 
Domain names that incorporate trademarks reflect the positive 
externalities that come from a source-identifying mark. The information 
content of LEXUS means that buyorleasealexus.com conveys 
information that buyorleasejapanesecars.com cannot. Stretching 
standard infringement doctrine to reach such domain names threatens 
these externalities by giving marks protection that is both internally 
and externally thick.  
ACPA and the UDRP together have the potential of creating a 
more calibrated trademark regime. There is an effective property right 
to TRADEMARK.com, but it is linked to a use in which the trademark 
is more likely to be conveying a source signal. Beyond that, courts are 
free to balance interests. Stated another way, protection for 
TRADEMARK.com is externally thick, but internally thin. The im-
portance of context is comparatively limited if the defendant uses 
TRADEMARK.com, but the range of equivalents protected by the 
courts can be relatively narrow.246 Room remains for 
wesellTRADEMARK.com. This enables uses that take advantage of a 
mark’s externalities while preserving whatever special signal inheres to 
TRADEMARK.com. 
b. Dilution 
A 2006 amendment changed federal dilution law to require only a 
“likelihood” of dilution by blurring or tarnishment rather than requiring 
the plaintiff to prove that dilution had actually occurred.247 This was 
no small change, as dilution, and the consumer mental process that 
 
245. Grynberg, supra note 205, at 1485. 
246. See Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 
2010) (“Outside the special case of trademark.com, or domains that actively 
claim affiliation with the trademark holder, consumers don’t form any firm 
expectations about the sponsorship of a website until they’ve seen the landing 
page—if then.”). But see id. at 1185 (Fernandez, J., concurring) (disagreeing 
with the majority on this point). 
247. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 
1730 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c) to make actionable acts causing a likelihood of dilution). 
The old statute authorized suit against a use that “causes dilution” of a 
famous mark. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-98, 
§ 3(a), 109 Stat. 985. In Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 
433 (2003), the Supreme Court held that that meant a plaintiff must prove 
actual, rather than likely, dilution. 
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produces it, is conceptually elusive.248 Proving a harm you can’t define 
is never easy. 
Nor is sitting in judgment of the claim. Knowing when a mark has 
been blurred is hard enough without engaging in predictions about 
when the harm becomes likely.249 As a result, some courts treat famous 
marks as externally thick in dilution cases, gliding over the tricky 
factual question with comparatively simple inquiries as to whether the 
defendant’s mark is sufficiently similar to a famous mark. If so, there is 
likely dilution; if not, there isn’t.250 
This is effectively the modular story of trademarks in that it uses 
property rights to let the mark owner manage uses that might affect 
distinctiveness. As an externality management device, this might make 
sense if the dilution story is true. That is, if it is really possible for 
VISA the credit card to lose distinctiveness as a result of a language 
tutoring service called eVISA,251 then allowing the credit card company 
to have expanded rights preserves the positive externalities of other 
third-party uses. And even if the dilution story is bogus, the harm of 
the claim is minimized if the mark’s protection is internally thin. 
Enjoining eVISA is one thing, even if mistaken, but blocking 
VISALANGUAGE would be quite another. 
c. Intermediary Liability 
If domain names and dilution reflect a thickening of trademark 
protection for uses seen as implicating source-related meaning, the de-
velopment of the case law for online intermediaries shows the potential 
for thinning protection with respect to more extended meanings. 
This shift is noted above in the discussion of the increasing judicial 
comfort with using trademarks to identify product categories online.252 
Keyword advertising and related activities reflect the high positive 
 
248. See Tushnet, supra note 216, at 546. 
249. Id. at 544–45. 
250. Compare Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 
2010) (declining to reach issue of admissibility of dilution plaintiff’s market 
surveys and expert testimony because a dilution plaintiff “may rely entirely on 
the characteristics of the marks at issue” and defendant presented no evidence 
“to rebut the inference of likely dilution created by the strength and similarity 
of the marks”), with Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 736 F.3d 
198, 211 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming verdict that CHARBUCKS not likely to 
dilute STARBUCKS for coffee and observing that the upheld finding of 
minimal similarity between the marks “weighs heavily in [defendant’s] favor. 
Certainly, a plaintiff may show a likelihood of dilution notwithstanding only 
minimal similarity. But here, minimal similarity strongly suggests a relatively 
low likelihood of an association diluting the senior mark.”). 
251. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 610 F.3d at 1092. 
252. See supra notes 184–199 and accompanying text. 
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externalities that trademarks generate. A mark is capable of 
simultaneously signaling both product source and a product’s category. 
That is, a search on a trademarked term may be for a specific product 
(e.g., TYLENOL) or products in that category (e.g., drugs containing 
acetaminophen, the generic term for TYLENOL’s active ingredient).253 
Courts seem to be drifting to a position of accepting keyword 
advertising. Although stopping short of immunizing the practice from 
trademark challenge, they increasingly demand a close look at the sur-
rounding circumstances, indicating thin protection for the evocation 
value of the marks in question.254 In Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc.,255 for 
example, the jewelry seller sought to shut down eBay’s use of its marks 
to advertise and list sales of branded merchandise. Tiffany’s specific 
complaint stemmed from the fact that many listings of TIFFANY 
products on eBay were for counterfeits, but it still attacked eBay for 
direct infringement by (truthfully) advertising the presence of Tiffany-
branded goods on the site and using the trademarked term on its site.256 
The Second Circuit dismissed out of hand the notion that eBay’s 
use of the TIFFANY trademark constituted direct trademark infringe-
ment.257 The only real trademark claim (on which eBay also prevailed) 
was with respect to the more contextual question of whether eBay was 
liable for contributory infringement. The court concluded that eBay 
could not be liable without actual knowledge of specific infringing acts. 
Merely using the mark was not enough.258 
By evaluating claims like Tiffany’s with more context-oriented 
doctrines, the courts are in effect reducing or eliminating consideration 
of the internal thickness of the marks at issue. It is not enough that the 
defendant appropriates them in full. She must also do something more 
 
253. Grynberg, supra note 67, at 111–12. 
254. See supra notes 196–197 and accompanying text. It is also worth noting that 
in these cases the mark only receives internally thin protection as well insofar 
as suits for keyword advertising and related practices generally come about 
only if someone buys the trademark qua trademark as a keyword. The 
interesting development from the early initial interest confusion cases to today 
is that courts have started to give the marks considerably thinner external 
protection as well. 
255. 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
256. Id. at 101–02. 
257. Id. at 103 (observing that eBay “used the mark to describe accurately the 
genuine Tiffany goods offered for sale on its website”); id. at 102–03 (“We 
have recognized that a defendant may lawfully use a plaintiff’s trademark 
where doing so is necessary to describe the plaintiff’s product and does not 
imply a false affiliation or endorsement by the plaintiff of the defendant.”). 
258. Id. at 103–10. 
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that will result in consumer confusion, a determination that is made by 
looking beyond the trademark.259 
Conclusion 
Just because ambiguities of language and meaning are trademark 
law’s stock in trade does not mean trademark law is always sure about 
how to deal with them. The wide range of interconnected messages and 
interpretations enabled and embodied by trademarks persistently 
complicates litigation about the Lanham Act’s scope and application. 
One way that judges manage the resulting information problems is by 
avoidance. They calibrate the thickness of protection given to a mark, 
adjusting the amount of context necessary for liability in a way that 
allows simple case dispositions. The practice complicates doctrinal 
development, but its appeal might be explained as an attempt to 
manage information. This explanation overlaps with descriptions of 
property rights as an information-management tool. On this logic, the 
problem of thickness of protection unifies trademark’s information 
problem with the longer historical debate about the extent to which 
trademarks should be treated as a form of property. 
The problems with treating trademarks as property are well known 
and they apply to calibrations of trademark thickness. The property 
shortcut creates sufficient problems in application that judges cannot 
follow it to its logical conclusion, but the temptation to start down the 
road is nonetheless strong. This creates a push/pull dynamic that 
exacerbates policy tensions within trademark law. 
Given that descriptive point, there may not be much to say norm-
atively. This Article nonetheless argues that the case for thick trade-
marks is strongest at trademark’s traditional core, to preserve the 
source signal from which other meanings are built. Building on this 
point, to the extent trademark law feels the need to do more, it is 
preferable to carve out pockets in which protection is strong but narrow 
and the exception is largely isolated from the general operation of 
trademark law. The mixed public and private regimes governing do-
main names is an example of this approach, which might be generalized 
to other doctrines. For example, perhaps the merchandising right is 
here to stay, but if so, it will be less disruptive to trademark law if  
259. One might rejoin that Tiffany was nonetheless a case about source insofar as 
Tiffany objected to the sale of counterfeit merchandise. But the claim was 
against eBay, not the sellers of fake jewelry. By bragging of the availability 
of TIFFANY jewelry, eBay invoked extended meanings of Tiffany as 
connotative of a high-class product or a famous brand name. eBay in turn 
could use those meanings to paint itself as a marketplace for those kind of 
goods. Cf. Multi Time Mach., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 804 F.3d 930, 933 
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1231 (2016) (“By going beyond exactly 
matching a user’s query to text describing a product, Amazon’s search 
function can provide consumers with relevant results that would otherwise be 
overlooked.”). 
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restricted to the classic merchandising case (e.g., a logo-bearing baseball 
cap) without spilling into other arenas in which a trademark owner 
might claim confusion as to its approval of the mark’s use. 
More optimistically, we might confront the policy questions 
addressed by thickness calibrations more directly. We may have 
differing views about the level of propertization appropriate to give us 
the information landscape that we want. But whether your vision of 
the ideal is best accomplished by robust or non-existent property rights, 
it is important to appreciate the extent to which courts mask these 
determinations in other inquiries. Policy choices should be seen for what 
they are. 
